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Abstract
This paper examines the design of corporate integration systems, comparing
integration limited to equity issued after enactment (New Equity Integration or
NEI) to integration that applies to all equity (complete integration). It shows that
NEI achieves all of the efficiency benefits of complete integration at a fraction of
the cost. NEI, unlike complete integration, is, moreover, supported by both the
traditional view and the new view of the effects of dividend taxation. From an
efficiency perspective, NEI is strictly better than complete integration.
The problem NEI systems face that complete integration systems do not is
distinguishing new equity from old and preventing churning, transactions
designed to allow old equity to get the integration benefits given to new equity.
Churning, I argue, is like any other type of avoidance. Few systems completely
stop avoidance, and we generally try to limit avoidance rather than allow it freely,
which is what complete integration effectively allows. To understand the viability
of new equity from old, the paper considers three NEI systems: an explicit
transition tax, a tracing method described in the American Law Institute’s 1982
and 1989 corporate tax reports, and a set of methods based on the economics of
consumption taxes. Although all three present trade-offs and administrative
problems, all three are feasible. As a result, studies of integration should focus on
NEI rather than complete integration.
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The double-level tax on corporate earnings is thought to discourage the use of
the corporate form, to encourage corporations to retain earnings, and to encourage
the use of debt financing in place of equity financing. 1 Eliminating or reducing
these distortions by eliminating one of the two levels of taxes, a policy known as
corporate integration, is one of the central components of many tax reform
proposals. 2
Examinations of corporate integration tend to take a dichotomous view of the
available policies: they take the view that we should either have what I will call

1

See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE
TAX SYSTEMS, TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992), p. vii.
2

Major proposals for corporate integration include DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TAX
REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1984); DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 2; DEPARTMENT
OF THE TREASURY, A RECOMMENDATION FOR INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE
TAX SYSTEMS (1992); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTEGRATION
OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAXES, REPORTER’S STUDY OF CORPORATE TAX
INTEGRATION (1993). In addition, President George W. Bush proposed integrating the corporate
tax in 2003. For a discussion of the Bush proposal, see R. Glenn Hubbard, Economic Effects of the
2003 Partial Integration Proposal in the United States, 12 INT. TAX PUBLIC FINANCE 97–108
(2005).
There are a large number of academic studies of corporate integration. These include George
F. Break, Integrating Corporate and Personal Income Taxes: The Charter Commission Proposals
Tax Simplification and Reform, 34 LAW CONTEMP. PROBL. 726–735 (1969); Charles E. McLure Jr,
Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax
Reform Proposals, 88 HARV. LAW REV. 532–582 (1975); Martin Feldstein & Daniel Frisch,
Corporate tax integration: The estimated effects on capital accumulation and tax distribution of
two integration proposals, 30 NATL. TAX J. 37–52 (1977); Alvin Warren, The relation and
integration of individual and corporate income taxes, 94 HARV. LAW REV. 717–800 (1981); Alan
J. Auerbach, Tax Integration and the “New View” of the Corporate Tax: A 1980’S Perspective, 74
PROC. ANNU. CONF., TAX. NATL. TAX ASSOC. 21–27 (1981); CHARLES BALLARD ET AL.,
INTEGRATION OF THE CORPORATE AND PERSONAL INCOME TAXES 153–170 (1985); R. Glenn
Hubbard, Corporate Tax Integration: A View From the Treasury Department, 7 J. ECON.
PERSPECT. 115–132 (1993); Michael J Graetz & Alvin Warren, Integration of Corporate and
Shareholder Taxes, 69 NATL. TAX J. 677–700 (2016). In addition, the Tax Law Review published
a symposium on corporate integration in its spring 1992 issue.
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complete integration or none. 3 Complete integration is an integration system that
applies to equity existing at the time of enactment (existing equity or old equity)
and to equity issued after the time of enactment (new equity). As will be
explained below, complete integration is thought to be premised on empirical
support for a model of the effects of the corporate tax known as the Traditional
View instead of an alternative model, known as the New View. If the Traditional
View holds, the efficiency gains from complete integration are thought to be
substantial, while if the New View holds, they are modest. Because of the
considerable revenue costs, complete integration is only desirable with the
efficiency gains that come with the Traditional View. If instead, the New View
holds, integration may not be desirable because the revenue costs of eliminating
the double-level tax might exceed the efficiency gains.
My goal here is to reexamine the arguments for integration, focusing on the
implications of the Traditional and New Views. My core conclusion is that what I
will call New Equity Integration or NEI, which is integration applied only to
equity issued after the date of enactment, is preferable to either complete
integration or no integration. NEI achieves all of the efficiency gains of complete
integration, is supported by both the New View and the Traditional View, and
would only cost a fraction of the cost of complete integration.
The central problem with NEI is that it requires distinguishing new equity
from old. New and old equity in the same class of shares cannot be distinguished
by observable features. And even if there were a method of distinguishing new
and old equity – suppose that the law required new equity to be of a different and
identifiable class – corporations could redeem their old equity and issue new
equity with the same economic rights. A corporation that does this would not have
changed its capital structure, its investments, or anything else that might matter –

3

As will be discussed, the American Law Institute 1982 and 1989 reports are important
exceptions. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT SUBCHAPTER C:
PROPOSALS ON CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DISTRIBUTIONS AND REPORTER’S STUDY ON
CORPORATION DISTRIBUTIONS (1982); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX
PROJECT: REPORTER’S STUDY DRAFT (1989).
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it would have simply moved pieces of paper around. It would, however, argue that
it has new equity eligible for the benefits of NEI.
That taxpayers will engage in transactions to allow old equity to get new
equity treatment, which I will call churning, reduces the benefits of NEI. The
prospect of churning may mean that NEI systems need elaborate rules to prevent
it. Churning that remains notwithstanding these rules will increase the revenue
cost of NEI and distort financial structures. Although it is lost in the fog of time, it
seems that the reason that NEI has not received significant attention is that the
problems of churning are thought to be so difficult that they cannot be overcome. 4
As a result, perhaps complete integration is a better option than NEI.
Churning, I will argue, however, should be analyzed and treated like other tax
avoidance problems. Any time the tax law has to draw a line, taxpayers will seek
to structure transactions to be on the favorable side of the line, generating
economic distortions and revenue losses. Our general approach to this sort of tax
avoidance is to try to limit it. Only rarely do we say that a particular tax avoidance
problem is so severe that it is better to just allow it rather than incur the costs of
trying to prevent it. 5 Yet complete integration does exactly that. It automatically
grants the benefits of churning to old equity. It is, effectively, NEI plus free
churning. While allowing free churning might be the right choice, it is not the
standard approach to line drawing, and, at a minimum, we need to at least analyze
the costs of churning and anti-churning rules before deciding.
To understand the costs of churning, we need to consider methods of limiting
integration to new equity. I will examine three: (1) a method based on a
suggestion by Alan Auerbach in a 1990 paper to combine complete integration
with an explicit tax on existing equity that equals, in present value, the tax that

4

Alan Auerbach makes this argument in Alan J. Auerbach, Taxation and corporate financial
policy, 3 HANDB. PUBLIC ECON. 1251–1292, 1262 (2002).
5

See David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 UNIV. CHIC. LAW REV. 860–886
(1999); David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths about Tax Shelters Symposium on Corporate Tax
Shelters: Part I, 55 TAX LAW REV. 215–254 (2001); David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of
Anti-Tax Avoidance Doctrines, 4 AM. LAW ECON. REV. 88–115 (2002).
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would have been imposed had the dividend tax been retained on that equity; 6 (2) a
tracing mechanism proposed by William Andrews in a 1982 and a 1989 American
Law Institute study, a version of which was used in Sweden for more than 30
years and Finland for almost 20; 7 and (3) a set of methods based on the
economics of cash-flow taxes and the transition to a consumption tax. 8 I will
conclude that none of these methods is without flaws but that any of them could
be made to work. I conclude that NEI is likely superior to complete integration
even once we consider churning and implementation costs. Studies of corporate
integration should focus on NEI rather than complete integration.
This paper has five parts. To understand the comparison between NEI and
complete integration, we need a clear understanding of the economic distortions
caused by the current corporate tax system and the complete integration proposals
to fix them. Parts 1 and 2 provide this background, for the most part reviewing
existing literature. Part 1 examines the distortions caused by current law. Part 2
considers complete integration methods, focusing on the most prominent methods
that have been proposed or have been used in other countries.
Part 3 takes up new equity integration. It makes two claims. First, Part 3
shows that NEI can achieve all of the efficiency benefits of complete integration
at a lower cost. While this claim is not novel,9 it seems to be widely forgotten,

6

Alan J Auerbach, Debt, Equity, and the Taxation of Corporate Cash Flows, in DEBT,
TAXES, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 91–125 (John Shoven & Joel Waldfoget eds., 1990).
7

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 4; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 4. The
Swedish and Finnish systems are described in Mervyn A. King & Don Fullerton, Sweden, in THE
TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES, THE
UNITED KINGDOM, SWEDEN, AND GERMANY 87–148 (Mervyn A. King & Don Fullerton eds.,
1984); Krister Andersson et al., Corporate Tax Policy in the Nordic Countries, in TAX POLICY IN
THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 72–137 (Peter Birch Sørensen ed., 1998).
8

While a consumption tax approach is, to my knowledge, largely novel, a brief discussion of
this approach can be found in the 1982 ALI report. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 4 at
364–365.
9

E.g., Auerbach, supra note 3; Auerbach, supra note 5; Auerbach, supra note 7.
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ignored, and sometimes disputed, including by some of the major studies on
integration. 10 The second claim is that churning should be treated like other
forms of avoidance: merely because most NEI methods will allow some churning
does not means we should have complete integration which amounts to free
churning. Part 4 considers the three NEI methods mentioned above. Part 5
concludes.
1. Background: Defects in current law
The goal of this section is to analyze the distortions created by the corporate
tax system. To do this, I will compare the tax rates on different ways of investing.
Differential tax rates on different investments create incentives to avoid high tax
investments and to make low tax investments, creating inefficiencies. Part 1.1
describes the taxes on different ways of investing, and Part 1.2 analyzes how
these taxes alter incentives.
1.1 Effective tax rates on forms of investment in current law
There are three ways corporations can invest: through retained earnings, by
borrowing, and by issuing new stock. We want to compare the tax rate on these
investments to the tax rate on investments made outside of the corporate sector.
The matter is complex because the tax in each of these cases depends on the
type of investor. As we will see, one of the central questions in designing an
integrated corporate tax system is the extent to which we can, or should, match
tax rates on corporate investment to the tax rates on different types of investors.
Different integration proposals give different answers.

10

The Treasury Department discussion of new equity integration seems to argue that its
merit depends on a belief that the new view of corporation taxation is correct. See DEPARTMENT
OF THE TREASURY, supra note 2 at 109. As I will discuss, this argument is not correct. NEI is
supported by both the new view and the traditional view. In addition, the 1993 ALI report on
corporate integration considered and rejected NEI in favor of complete integration. Supra note 3,
pp. 205-209. I discuss the arguments made by the ALI in note 44.
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Although there are many types of investors in corporations, most of them are
intermediaries (such as other corporations, financial institutions, and
partnerships). If we trace investments through to their ultimate owners, we can
think of there as being three types of investors in corporations: taxable individuals
(taxable at progressive rates but for the most part at the highest marginal rate),
tax-exempt entities, (including pension funds, retirement accounts, and charitable
endowments), and foreigners (from various home countries, taxable under their
home country regimes).
Determining the proportion of each type of investor is not straightforward
because we have to trace flows through intermediaries to their ultimate owners.
Estimates vary. 11 The proportion of individual investors seems to be somewhere
between 25% and 50%, with tax-exempt and foreigners splitting the rest. The
exact numbers are not important for the analysis below, however, so I will use as
a proxy, an assumption that there are roughly ⅓ of each type of investor, which is
roughly in line with recent estimates.
Our goal is to determine the tax rate on four different types of investments –
investments in new equity, in debt, via retained earnings, and outside the
corporate sector – for each of three different types of investors – taxable
individuals, tax-exempt entities, and foreigners.
To do this, I will start by considering a taxable individual investor, giving a
numerical example and then providing a general formula for each type of
investment. After going through all four investments in the individual case, I will
discuss how the results change for tax-exempt and foreign investors.

11

See Joseph Rosenberg, Corporate Dividends Paid and Received, 2003-2009, TAX NOTES
1475 (2012); Steven Rosenthal & Lydia Austin, The Dwindling Share of U.S. Corporate Stock,
151 TAX NOTES 923–934 (2016).
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1.1.1 Taxable investor
Non-corporate investment.
Suppose that a taxable investor makes a $100 investment directly (or through
a pass-through entity such as a partnership) and that the investment will return
$110 in one year (or 10% for n years). The pre-tax return is $10. If the tax rate is
40%, the investor pays a $4 tax, leaving him with $6 of gain and $106 in his
pocket. The 40% tax rate reduces the pre-tax return from 10% to 6%.
In the general case, with an arbitrary rate of return r, a tax rate of t, and an
investment that lasts for an arbitrary number of periods, n, the rate of return is: 12

Non-corporate investment: 1  r 1 t  .
n

New Equity.
Suppose that instead of investing an asset directly, the investor contributes
$100 to a corporation in exchange for new stock and the corporation makes the
investment in the asset. If the corporate tax rate is also 40%, after one year, the
corporation, having earned $10, would owe $4 of tax, leaving it with a return of
$6 and $106 of cash. If the corporation distributes the $106 to the investor, the
investor is taxed on the $6 of dividend income. (The return of the original $100
investment is not taxed). If dividends are taxed as ordinary income, the investor
would pay a 40% tax on the $6 or $2.40. He would be left with $3.60 in after-tax
earnings, giving him a 3.6% rate of return.
The combination of the corporate and individual taxes reduces the 10% pretax return to 3.6%, creating an effective tax rate of 64%. In notation, the return

12

Note that the formula in the text assumes current taxation of the return rather than deferral
of tax until the final period. If instead the investor can defer taxation until period n, when the
investment is cashed out, the return would be 1  r  1  t   t .
n
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has gone from r to r 1 d 1 c, where c is the corporate tax rate and d is the
dividend tax rate. The effective tax rate is 1 r 1 d 1 c , or 64%.
To write down the general formula for the return to new equity, we have to
make an assumption about the pattern of dividend payments. In its analysis for its
1993 integration study, the American Law Institute assumed for new equity that
returns in each period are distributed, generating a dividend tax, and the after-tax
portion is contributed back to the corporation and reinvested. 13 In this case, the
after-tax return is the same as for the one-year case because in each period the
return faces both a corporate and individual tax. Algebraically, the return is

New equity, immediate distribution: 1  r 1 c1 d  .
n

If instead, the corporation retains the earnings and pays them out after n years,
individuals would not pay a dividend tax in the interim. If the individual does not
sell his stock, so that there is no interim capital gains tax,14 the return is

New equity, retention: 1  r 1 c 1 d   d .
n

The return in the retention case is uniformly higher than the distribution case
(other than when n = 1, when the two are equal). If an investor is going to finance
an n-period project using new equity, it makes sense to defer the dividend tax
until period n. One way to think about this is that, as we will see, there is a
penalty for using new equity. Paying a dividend and reinvesting in each period is
akin to paying the new equity penalty in each period. If an investment is to last for
n years, it does not make sense to distribute the earnings during an intermediate

13

14

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 3, p. 24 (table 1, line 2) and 27 (Table 2, line 3).

Computing the effective capital gains tax is complex because capital gains on sales are
eventually offset by capital losses after dividends are paid. For an examination of the interaction of
dividends and capital gains taxes, see David A. Weisbach, Capital Gains Taxation and Corporate
Investment, 70 NATL. TAX J. 621-642 (2017).
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period and have the shareholder contribute them back to the corporation.
Therefore, when computing the return to issuing new equity, I will assume
earnings are retained for the duration of a project that the new equity funds. 15
Debt.
Investments in corporations can also be made by lending money to the
corporation. Suppose that the investor lends $100 to the corporation, and the
corporation invests the money at a 10% rate of return. The corporation will once
again earn $110 and have $10 of income. If the interest rate on the debt is 10%,
the corporation will owe the investor $10 of interest and be able to deduct that
payment. As a result, the corporation will have no net income and pay no taxes.
The investor will have $10 of interest income, and owe $4 of taxes, leaving him
with a $6 or 6% after tax return. Using the tax rates we have been assuming, the
tax rate on debt investments is 40% or t. If we let the tax rate on interest income
be td (which could be different than the tax rate applicable to other types of
income), we get

Debt: 1  r 1 td  .
n

Retained earnings.
Suppose that the corporation has $100 of retained earnings that it can choose
to invest at a 10% pre-tax return or to distribute to its shareholders, who can also
invest it at a 10% return. If the corporation invests the $100, in one year, it will
have $110 before taxes and $106 after paying taxes on its $10 of gain.

15

An advantage of the ALI approach is that it makes the pattern for taxation of new equity
more similar to the pattern assumed for outside investment. It is likely that outside investments
have different tax patterns depending on the applicable tax rules and the cash flows that come
from the investment. Similarly, corporations may pay current dividends on new equity for non-tax
reasons, which means that the return on some new equity will be taxed immediately. Although the
choice of the tax patterns matter for estimates of the size of the distortions from the corporate tax,
it does not matter for the discussion here: either way, we can see the existence of the distortion.
Therefore, to a great extent, these choices are immaterial for the analysis.
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After one year, the corporation can distribute $106 to its shareholders.
Because this is a distribution of retained earnings, the shareholders will be taxed
on the entire amount. 16 They will have $106 of dividend income. After paying a
40% tax on the dividend, they are left with $63.60.
Compare that to an immediate distribution of the $100 of retained earnings.
The shareholders will have an immediate $100 dividend and will be left with $60
after paying the dividend tax. If they invest it at a 10% pre-tax return, they are left
with $66 in one year. They have to pay a tax of $2.40 on the $6 of earnings,
leaving them with $63.60 in after-tax returns.
The shareholders are left with the same amount regardless of whether the
corporation invests the money and distributes the after-tax returns in the future or
whether the corporation distributes the money and lets the shareholders invest it.
The reason the amounts are the same is that the amount of the distribution, and
therefore, the size of the tax on the distribution, grows over time at the after-tax
rate of return. The shareholders are indifferent to paying a tax on a $100 dividend
today or on $106 next year because $106 is the future value of $100 at the 6%
after-tax rate of return.
We can express this relationship algebraically. Suppose that the corporation
has $1 of after-tax cash that it can invest at a pre-tax rate of return of r. If it
invests it for n periods, it will have $11  r 1 c . When it distributes this
n

amount to the shareholder, the shareholder will pay a dividend tax at rate d,
leaving him with $11 d 1  t 1 c . If instead the corporation distributes $1
n

immediately, the investor can invest $11 d . After n periods, he has

$11 d 1  t 1 t  . That is
n

16

In the new equity case, the shareholders will have contributed after-tax dollars to the
corporation, get a basis in his stock of $100, and, therefore will not be taxed on $100 of the $106
distribution. In the retained earnings case, whatever the shareholder’s original contribution, there
will be a dividend tax on the retained earnings when distributed.
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Retained Earnings:
Immediate distribution: 1 d 1  r 1 t 

n

Future distribution: 1  r 1 c 1 d 
n

Note that we can see from the algebraic expressions that the equality result in the
numerical example (i.e., the investor was left with $63.60 in both cases) depended
on an assumption that the corporate tax rate and the individual tax rate were the
same. If the two differ, the after-tax return to retaining the earnings and to
immediately distributing them would not be the same.
Summary. We can summarize these results with the following table.
Table 1: Investment returns for taxable investor
Investment choice

After-tax return

1.

Non-corporate

1  r 1 t 

2.

New equity

1  r 1 c 1 d   d

3.

Debt

1  r 1 td 

4.

Retained earnings, corporate investment

1  r 1 c 1 d 

5.

Retained earnings, immediate distribution

1 d 1  r 1 t 

n

n

n

n

n

1.1.2 Tax-exempt investors
Tax-exempt investors do not pay tax on dividends. Nevertheless, because the
corporate tax is based on corporate income regardless of the identity of the
shareholder, their investments in stock are still subject to the corporate tax.
Therefore, their returns for investing in new equity (line 2) or for retained
earnings where the corporation makes the investment (line 4) can be expressed by
setting d = 0 but leaving the corporate tax rate, c, the same. Tax-exempts also do
not pay tax on interest income. Therefore, their return for investing in corporate
debt can be expressed by setting td = 0 in line 3.
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Their treatment of alternative investments (line 1 and line 5) is more
complex. If they invest directly in a trade or business that is not related to their
exempt purpose, they are subject to the unrelated business income tax or UBIT.
This tax is at the same rate as the corporate tax. If they invest indirectly, such as
through a partnership, they can still be subject to UBIT unless the investment
meets strict requirements. To the extent that outside investments are subject to
UBIT, the expressions for line 1 and line 5 in Table 1 are correct, setting t equal
to c. To the extent that investments are not subject to UBIT, the tax rate in lines 1
and 5 should be zero.
It is not clear whether the marginal investment by a tax-exempt is subject to
UBIT. Very little UBIT is collected, which might seem to indicate that the tax is
unimportant. 17 For administrative reasons relating primarily to ease of filing,
however, I am told that tax-exempt investors often structure investments through
corporate shells and have that shell pay the corporate tax on its income instead of
the tax-exempt investor paying UBIT. Therefore, that very little UBIT is paid
does not mean that marginal investments by tax-exempts are not effectively
subject to tax.
Because it is uncertain, I present the results for both possibilities, that UBIT
applies and that it does not. Using these values gives the following set of returns
for tax-exempts, we get

17

According to a recent report from the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, tax-exempt
entities paid about $10.3 billion in UBIT tax in 2008 but had total income of $1.35 trillion, which
means that more than 99% of their income was not subject to UBIT. Katherine Toran, The
Unrelated Business Income Tax, URBAN INSTITUTE (2016), https://perma.cc/CH22-GLSM.
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Table 2: Investment returns for tax-exempt investors
Investment choice

After-tax return

1.

Non-corporate

1  r 

2.

New equity

1  r 1 c

3.

Debt

1  r 

4.

Retained earnings, corporate investment

1  r 1 c

5.

Retained earnings, immediate distribution

1  r 

n

or 1  r 1 c 

n

n

n

n

n

or 1  r 1 c 

n

1.1.3 Foreign investors
Foreigners will be subject to their home country taxation at rate f on outside
investments (line 1). Foreign investors in U.S. debt (line 3), including corporate
debt, are, for the most part, not taxed by the United States on the receipt of
interest payments. 18 They will, however, be subject to home country tax at rate fd.
If a foreigner invests in U.S. stock, any dividends paid to the foreigner are
subject to a 30% withholding tax, w. 19 The withholding tax rate is often reduced
by treaty to 15% or even 5%. 20 There might also be a residual foreign tax. If the
withholding tax can be credited against the residual foreign tax, the tax rate on
dividends would be the greater of f or w. For notational simplicity in the table
below, I use w for that rate, effectively assuming no residual foreign tax. This
gives us the results for new equity (line 2) and retained earnings (lines 4 and 5).

18

I.R.C. § 871(h).

19

I.R.C. § 1441.

20

Internal Revenue Service, Table 1: Withholding Tax Rates on Income Other Than Personal
Service Income Under Chapter 3, Internal Revenue Code, and Income Tax Treaties (2016),
www.irs.gov/PUP/individuals/international/Tax_Treaty_Table_1.pdf.
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Table 3: Investment returns for foreign investors (no residual foreign tax)
Investment choice

After-tax return

1.

Non-corporate

1  r 1 f 

2.

New equity

1  r 1 c 1 w  w

3.

Debt

1  r 1 f d 

4.

Retained earnings, corporate investment

1  r 1 c 1 w

5.

Retained earnings, immediate distribution

1 w1  r 1 f 

n

n

n

n

n

1.2 Distortions
These taxes create a number of economic distortions, which I review here. I
start by assuming, counterfactually, that all investors are taxable. This allows me
to establish the basic economics in a simple setting. I then relax that assumption
and consider how those results change when we add tax-exempt and foreign
investors.
1.2.1 Taxable Investors
The literature has traditionally pointed to three types of distortions from
current law: (i) the incentive to invest outside the corporate sector; (ii) the
incentive to invest in corporations via debt rather than new equity (resulting in
corporations that have too much leverage); and (iii) the incentive for corporations
to retain earnings. Consider each in turn.
The incentive to invest outside the corporate sector. To see how taxes affect
the incentive to invest outside the corporate sector, compare line 1 (return to noncorporate investment) to line 2 (return to new equity) in Table 1. As can be seen,
unless d = 0, there are no values of t, c, and d, where lines 1 and 2 are equal for all
values of n. Therefore, under current law, taxes will distort the incentives to invest
in new equity or outside the corporate sector.
To understand the direction of the effects, suppose that the corporate and
outside investor tax rates are the same (t = c). In this case, as long as d is positive,
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new equity investments have a lower after-tax return than investments made
outside the corporate sector because of the tax on dividends. As a result, if c = t,
there is an incentive to make investments outside the corporate sector, such as in
partnerships or directly. The same is true if c is greater than t.
On the other hand, if the corporate tax rate, c, is sufficiently below tax rate on
outside investments, t, there could be an incentive to invest in corporations rather
than through other vehicles. In effect, corporations become vehicles to defer tax.
The values of t, c, and d, that create this incentive depends on the length of
the investment n and on the pre-tax rate of return, r. To illustrate, under current
law, investors are taxed at about 40% on outside investments, corporations are
taxed at 35%, and dividends are taxed at about 20%. Using these numbers, there
is an incentive to invest outside the corporate sector for all but the longest of
investments: for a 10% pre-tax rate of return, investing through a corporation is
preferable only for investments of 45 years or longer. If the corporate rate were
reduced to 30% (holding other rates constant), investing through a corporation
would be preferable for investments that last 14 years or longer. If the corporate
rate were 25%, corporate investments would be preferred for all investments
longer than one year.
The incentive for corporations to use debt. Suppose that an investor would
like to invest in the corporate sector, and can do so by investing either in debt or
in new equity. To understand this choice, compare lines 2 and 3, which give the
after-tax return to new equity and to debt respectively. Once again, these will not
be equal for all values of n. The analysis is the same as immediately above,
substituting the tax rate on debt investments, td, for the tax rate on other
investments, t. Depending on parameter values, corporations may have an
incentive to either over or under-leverage.
The incentive to distribute or invest retained earnings: The discussion above
assumed that an investor had money outside a corporation and was considering
whether to invest it in the corporate sector or elsewhere, and if in a corporation, in
its debt or its stock. Consider now the case where a corporation itself has after-tax
earnings and is considering whether to distribute the earnings to its shareholder or
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whether to retain the earnings and invest the money itself. This choice can be
examined by comparing lines 4 and 5.
To simplify the analysis, assume for now that the corporate and investor rates
are the same, t = c. In this case, line 4 will always be equal to line 5, which means
that the after-tax return to distributing and retaining earnings is unaffected by
taxes. Regardless of the tax rate on dividends, there is no tax incentive to
distribute retained earnings. 21 One way this conclusion is often stated is that we
can think of the dividend tax as a toll charge for distributing earnings from a
corporation. Because corporate earnings grow at the after-tax rate of return, the
present value of the toll charge is the same regardless of when paid.
If we relax the assumption that the corporate tax rate and the tax rate on
outside investments are the same (allowing t ≠ c), there will be an incentive to
retain or distribute earnings. The reason is that the after-tax rates of return inside
and outside the corporation are not the same: r 1 t   r 1 c . The dividend tax
rate, however, does not alter this incentive. Instead, the incentive to retain or
distribute earnings arises because of the difference between the shareholder and
corporate rates.
The conclusion that the dividend tax has no effect on the timing of
distributions of retained earnings is known as the New View, after a series of
papers in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s which established this result. 22 It holds
for any tax rate on dividends as long as the tax rate does not change. (If the tax
rate changes, there is an incentive to distribute earnings when the rate is low.)

21

If the shareholders sell their stock during the period that earnings are retained, the resulting
capital gains tax may mean that the return on retained earnings is lower than on distributed
earnings.
22

See, e.g., Mervyn A. King, Taxation and the Cost of Capital, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 21
(1974); Alan J. Auerbach, Wealth Maximization and the Cost of Capital, 93 Q. J. ECON. 433
(1979); David F. Bradford, The incidence and allocation effects of a tax on corporate
distributions, 15 J. PUBLIC ECON. 1–22 (1981).
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Under the New View, if the corporate and individual rates are the same, the
choice of the corporation to invest or distribute retained earnings is not distorted.
To the extent that the New View holds, there is no benefit to reducing the
dividend tax. The dividend tax does not distort corporate investment choices but
raises revenue. With respect to existing corporate equity, it is lump sum.
Moreover, reducing the dividend tax results in windfall gains to existing
shareholders. To see why, consider the price of the stock of a corporation that has
$100 of retained earnings. If the dividend tax rate is 40%, the corporation’s stock
would be valued only at $60 because whenever the retained earnings are
distributed, they will bear a tax. The most that a shareholder can get out of the
corporation is $60 or the present value of $60. The New View, for this reason, is
sometimes called the tax capitalization view. Future dividend taxes are capitalized
into the share price.
If the tax rate on dividends were reduced to 10%, the value of the stock
would go up to $90 because the shareholder would be able to keep $90 out of the
$100 distribution. If the distribution were in a future year, the shareholder would
be able to keep the future value of $90. While the stock price would go up, the
corporation’s decision whether to invest or distribute the retained earnings would
not change (as long as the new tax rate were viewed as permanent). Lowering the
tax rate on dividends on existing equity, which is what most integration plans
would do, results in a windfall gain to shareholders without generating efficiency
benefits. 23
The major alternative to the New View is the Traditional View. 24 The
Traditional View emphasizes that corporate investments may need to be financed
with new equity. To the extent that corporations finance investments with new

23

24

See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 3 at 33–36.

Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POLIT. ECON.
215–215 (1962); M. S. Feldstein, Corporate Taxation and Dividend Behaviour, 37 REV. ECON.
STUD. 57–72 (1970); JAMES M. POTERBA & LAWRENCE H. SUMMERS, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
DIVIDEND TAXATION (1984), http://www.nber.org/papers/w1353.
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equity, the dividend tax does distort investment choices. Recall that if the
corporate and individual rates are the same (c = t), new equity is disadvantaged
relative to outside investments if the dividend tax rate, d, is positive. Corporations
using new equity to finance investments need to earn a higher rate of return to
offset the additional tax these investments bear, or equivalently, they will forego
investments that they would otherwise make if they could use retained earnings or
debt.
Moreover, even if a corporation currently has retained earnings sufficient to
cover current needs, if it anticipates that it might need new equity in the future, it
will have an incentive to retain earnings. The reason to retain earnings is to reduce
future new equity issuances and the resulting tax penalty. Therefore, even if
current projects are financed out of retained earnings, the double-level tax might
distort corporate behavior.
To the extent that the Traditional View holds, integration may lead to
substantial efficiency gains. The double-level tax discourages the use of new
equity. If new equity is an important source of funds, the double-level tax
discourages desirable corporate investments. To avoid this problem, corporations
have an incentive to finance projects with debt and to retain earnings, distorting
corporate capital structures. We have too few corporate investments, too much
corporate debt, and corporations unduly retain earnings. Eliminating the doublelevel tax reduces or eliminates these distortions.
Even if the New View better describes corporate financing than the
traditional view, the corporate tax may distort investment incentives. If the
corporate rate is not equal to the tax rate on outside investments, there will be an
incentive to retain or to distribute earnings. Moreover, even if the marginal source
of funds generally is retained earnings, some investments will need new funds.
For example, new ventures will not have retained earnings and large new projects
by existing ventures may need additional funds. To the extent retained earnings
are not sufficient to finance new projects, there will be an incentive to avoid using
new equity. Instead, new projects might be financed with debt or made outside the
corporate sector. There are, therefore, some distortions even under the New View,
but if the marginal source of funds for most projects is retained earnings, these
distortions may be small.
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Summary: We can summarize the implications for corporate tax policy as
follows. For taxable investors, the choice between (1) keeping the double-level
tax and (2) eliminating the double-level tax for all equity, likely depends on which
view better describes the effects of dividend taxes. If the Traditional View is
largely correct, eliminating the double-level tax may be desirable because the
distortions from the double tax are high. If the New View is correct, the
distortions from dividend taxes are small, so retaining current law may be
preferable. In particular, to the extent the New View is correct, lowering the
dividend tax leads to windfall gains to existing shareholders, gains which reduce
tax revenues but have no efficiency benefits. Therefore, the extent to which each
view holds is thought to determine the extent to which integration is desirable.
The distinction between these views is the marginal source of funds for
corporate investment. The New View emphasizes the case where corporations
fund projects from retained earnings while the Traditional View emphasizes the
use of new equity. Analysts have tried to distinguish between the new and
traditional views by looking at the response of dividend payments to taxation.
Under the New View, dividends should not be responsive to permanent changes
in the dividend tax rate. Instead, these changes are capitalized into the value of the
stock. Under the Traditional View, lowering the dividend tax rate should lead to
an increase in dividends because lowering the rate reduces the distortions from
issuing new equity.
There have been a large number of attempts to examine these effects, many
focusing on the 2003 dividend tax cut. 25 The evidence so far is ambiguous.

25

Recent work includes ALAN J. AUERBACH & KEVIN A. HASSETT, THE 2003 DIVIDEND TAX
(2005), http://www.nber.org/papers/w11449;
Alan Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett, Dividend Taxes and Firm Valuation: New Evidence, 96 AM.
ECON. REV. 119–123 (2006); Alan J. Auerbach et al., The 2003 Dividend Tax Cuts and the Value
of the Firm: An Event Study, in TAXING CORPORATE INCOME IN THE 21ST CENTURY 93–126
(2007); Danny Yagan, Capital Tax Reform and the Real Economy: The Effects of the 2003
Dividend Tax Cut, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 3531–3563 (2015); Dhammika Dharmapala, The Impact
of Taxes on Dividends and Corporate Financial Policy: Lessons from the 2000s, TAX POLICY
LESSONS 2000S 1999 (2009); Zhonglan Dai et al., Capital Gains Taxes and Asset Prices:
Capitalization or Lock-in?, 63 J. FINANCE 709–742 (2008); Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez,
CUTS AND THE VALUE OF THE FIRM: AN EVENT STUDY
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Realistically, each view probably describes some portion of firms. For example,
new firms will often need equity to get started or to finance growth. Mature firms
may have sufficient cash flow to finance new projects out of retained earnings.
1.2.2 General case: multiple types of investors
To understand the more general case, start by examining the incentives if the
investor is tax exempt and if the investor is foreign, each taking on its own. After
outlining these effects, we can consider the effects when all three types of
investors are present.
Tax-exempt investors
Suppose that the investor is tax-exempt. To understand the effects, we need
to know whether marginal alternative investment is subject to UBIT. Suppose, to
start, that UBIT does not apply to marginal alternative investments.
In this case, an examination of Table 2 shows that there is an incentive to
avoid any use of the corporate form other than through a debt instrument. The
reason is that equity investments in corporations bear the corporate tax while
investments elsewhere and debt investments in corporations do not. As a result,
there is an inventive for corporations to distribute retained earnings and for
exempt investors not to invest in new corporate equity.
If the marginal investment bears UBIT, the incentives are different. In this
case, all investments other than in debt have the same after-tax rate of return. Taxexempts have incentives to purchase too much debt but there are no other
distortions.

Dividend Taxes and Corporate Behavior: Evidence from the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut, 120 Q. J.
ECON. 791–833 (2005).

New Equity Integration

Page 21

Foreign investors
The analysis for foreign investors is similar, replacing the usual tax on
dividends with withholding taxes. To the extent of the withholding tax (including
whether they are credited against foreign country taxes otherwise due), there is a
distortion in the choice between new equity, debt, and other investments. Foreign
investors have an incentive to invest outside the U.S. corporate sector and, if they
invest in the U.S. corporate sector, to invest in debt rather than equity. This may
affect the cost of capital and the financial structure of U.S. corporations.
The analysis of the incentive to distribute or retain earnings is similar to the
analysis above. The withholding tax will not distort this incentive as long as it
will be imposed at the same rate regardless of when earnings are distributed.
Differential tax rates on the growth of the investment, however, will distort this
choice. Given that each country will have a different tax rate, f, the U.S. corporate
tax rate cannot be equal to the foreign tax rate for all investors simultaneously.
Equilibrium effects
Suppose now that all three types of investors are present. The question is how
corporations set their investment policy and how investors choose their portfolios
in equilibrium.
The literature has not yet come to firm conclusions about the effects.
Attempting a complete analysis of equilibrium effects of taxes on corporate
investment and capital structures is well beyond the scope of this inquiry. Instead,
I will consider the direction such an analysis is likely to go. I break the analysis
into five steps.
First, prices should adjust to reduce opportunities to make profits as
corporations adjust their capital structures and dividend policies and as investors
adjust their portfolios. The best known example of this is the Miller equilibrium.26
Miller argued that if there is a tax advantage to debt (thereby threatening the

26

Merton H. Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32 J. FINANCE 261–275 (1977).
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Modigliani and Miller capital structure indifference theorem), corporations will
issue additional debt, driving up their borrowing rates, until indifference between
debt and equity is restored. Any tax advantage for debt is bid away.
What this means is that on the margin there is no advantage to debt, but
companies have too much leverage. That is, the price adjustments do not
eliminate the distortions caused by the different returns seen in Tables 1 through
3. Instead, the price adjustments eliminate the opportunity to make profits,
effectively capitalizing the distortions into the price of various investments. We
will have over-leverage, excess retained earnings (in a traditional view
equilibrium), and so forth.
Second, there are too many different types of investors and investments for
price adjustments to eliminate profits in any simple manner. To see this, consider
one (among many) hypothetical mechanisms for a corporation to finance a
project. Suppose that the corporation has $1 of retained earnings and has a project
that costs $1. The projects lasts for n periods, after which, the proceeds will be
distributed. To allow for equilibrium effects, allow the rate of return on debt to be
different than the rate of return on stock. In particular, let the rate of return
demanded by investors to purchase corporate debt be ρ, with ρ not necessarily
equal to r.
The corporation can finance the project with its retained earnings. If it does
so, a taxable shareholder’s n-period after-tax return will be 1  r 1 c 1 d .
n

Alternatively, it can finance the project by issuing new debt. To keep the overall
size of the corporation the same in the two cases, assume that if it issues new debt,
it distributes the $1 of retained and the shareholder lends the after-tax proceeds
back to the corporation which invests in the project. 27 In this case, a taxable





shareholder will have 1 d  1   1 t d  . If equilibrium pressures cause these

27

n

Note that the size of the investment in the two cases differs because in the case with the
immediate distribution, the investment is made with after-tax dollars while in the case where the
project is financed with retained earnings, it is made with pre-tax dollars.
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two returns to be equalized, we need the return on debt to adjust so that
 1 td   r 1 c.
Suppose now that there are also tax-exempt investors. If the investment is
financed with retained earnings, it will bear the corporate tax. If the investment is
financed with debt, it will not bear any tax. For the returns to be equalized, we
need   r 1 c. But this equality cannot hold if the equilibrium condition for
taxable investors just described is met. That is, given the multiple different kinds
of investments and investors, there is no set of tax rates that makes all investors
indifferent across all investments in any simple manner.
Third, in this circumstance – where returns cannot be equalized across all
investors and investments – the equilibrium will likely be a result of the relative
risk of different investments and the costs of concentration in particular types of
assets. 28 In particular, a given investment may be profitable for a given investor,
but as they purchase more of this investment, they reduce the diversification of
their portfolio. They will purchase more until the additional returns are offset by
the increased risk due to the loss of diversification.
Fourth, in this equilibrium, all investors are marginal, in the sense that they
balance the concentration of their portfolio in tax-favored assets with risk.
Changes to returns or to tax rates cause all investors to adjust their portfolios. An
implication is that the required rate of return for corporate investments depends on

28

Work includes Michael Brennan, Taxes, Market Valuation, and Corporate Financial
Policy, 23 NATL. TAX J. 417–427 (1970); Robert H. Litzenberger & Krishna Ramaswamy, The
effect of personal taxes and dividends on capital asset prices, 7 J. FINANC. ECON. 163–195 (1979);
Roger H. Gordon & David F. Bradford, Taxation and the stock market valuation of capital gains
and dividends, 14 J. PUBLIC ECON. 109–136 (1980); Alan J. Auerbach & Mervyn A. King,
Taxation, Portfolio Choice, and Debt-Equity Ratios: A General Equilibrium Model, 98 Q. J.
ECON. 587–609 (1983); STEPHEN R. BOND, MICHAEL P. DEVEREUX & ALEXANDER KLEMM, THE
EFFECTS OF DIVIDEND TAXES ON EQUITY PRICES: A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE 1997 U.K. TAX
REFORM (2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1033204 (last visited Jul 18, 2017); Mihir A
Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Dividend Taxes and International Portfolio Choice, 93 REV.
ECON. STAT. 266–284 (2010).
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the tax rates of all investors. The relevant tax rate, it turns out, is the weighted
average tax rate of all investors, weighted by the wealth of each investor.
Finally, if the relevant tax rate is the global average tax rate, integration may
have few benefits. Integration would, for the most part, reduce dividend taxes on
U.S. investors. Because U.S. investors hold only a modest portion of global
wealth, however, the effect of reducing taxes on U.S. investors on the global
average tax rate would be modest. The implication is that the efficiency benefits
of integration may not be worth the cost. 29
When I turn to NEI in Part 3, I will argue that the implication of this
conclusion is that if we pursue integration notwithstanding the possibly modest
benefits, it is even more important that we carefully target the efficiency gains and
minimize the cost. NEI better targets the efficiency gains and has a lower cost
than complete integration, which means that conditional on integration, these
equilibrium considerations will provide further support for NEI over complete
integration.
2. Complete integration solutions
In this section, I describe the most prominent complete integration systems
and their core features. The goal of these systems is to impose a tax on income
from corporate investments in a way that eliminates or at least minimizes the
distortions outlined above.
The key design issue arises because income from corporate investment is
reflected both at the corporate level, through ordinary corporate operations, and
the shareholder level through changes in stock price and distributions. Unless
stock is taxed on a mark-to-market basis, however, trying to tax the income at the
shareholder level (rather than the corporate level) creates deferral problems

29

An additional implication is that source-based taxes get shifted to immobile factors, such
as labor. This means that source-based taxes, such as the corporate-level tax, might be inefficient.
See Roger H Gordon, Taxation of investment and savings in a world economy, AM. ECON. REV.
1086–1102 (1986); Alan J. Auerbach, Michael P. Devereux & Helen Simpson, Taxing Corporate
Income, in MIRRLEES REVIEW, REFORMING THE TAX SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2008).
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because the shareholders can hold rather than sell their stock, deferring their tax.
Most integration methods, therefore, have an initial remittance of tax at the
corporate level based on corporate income. Because the income has been taxed at
the corporate level, most integration systems reduce or eliminate the dividend tax.
The key difference in integration systems is how or whether they coordinate the
ultimate tax imposed at the shareholder level with the remittance of tax at the
corporate level.
2.1 Dividend exclusion.
If all investors faced the same tax rate on outside investments, integration
would relatively straightforward. Simply set the corporate tax rate to be equal to
the tax rate on outside investments, (c = t), and set the dividend rate to be zero, (d
= 0). This system is known as a dividend exclusion system because dividends are
excluded from income. The tax on corporate investments is remitted by
corporations. With this system, taxpayers face the same tax rate regardless of
where they invest. If they invest outside the corporation, they face a tax rate of t
and if they invest in stock, they face a tax rate of c = t.
To illustrate, in our running example, when the individual contributes $100 to
the corporation, he would get a $100 basis in his stock. The corporation would
pay $4 of tax on the $10 of earnings, leaving it with $106 to distribute. The
shareholder would receive the $6 of after-corporate-tax earnings without paying
an additional tax on the dividend. He would treat the remaining $100 as a return
of basis. This is the same result the investor would get for investments outside the
corporate sector. 30

30

Dividend exclusion does not tax investments made through corporate stock exactly the
same was as investments made directly are taxed even if the statutory tax rate is the same. The
reason is that the tax system has a complex set of rules for how taxes on different investments are
computed and how those taxes interact. Dividend exclusion systems tax some investments at the
corporate level and others at the individual level, which means those interactions may not work the
same way as if all investments were taxed at individual level. The simplest example is losses: in a
dividend exclusion system, losses in the corporate sector cannot be used against gains outside the
corporate sector and vice versa. A broader reform considered by the Treasury, known as the
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All investors do not, however, face the same tax rate on outside investments.
This means that a dividend exclusion system cannot tax corporate investments the
same way outside investments are taxed for all investors at the same time. For
example, if taxable investors have a tax rate outside investments of 40% and taxexempts have a tax rate of 0%, the corporate tax rate under a dividend exclusion
system has to be both 40% and 0% simultaneously to eliminate distortions.
The Treasury Department in 1992 and the Bush administration in 2003
argued that a dividend exclusion system was the best complete integration system
notwithstanding this problem. The theory was, in part, that the simplicity of a
dividend exclusion system outweighs the costs of a more accurate system because
a dividend exclusion system might be able to get the rates relatively close to what
they should be. In particular, the Treasury believed that tax-exempts faced UBIT
on their investments and that the traditional view better fit the data. With these
beliefs and if we set c = t and d = 0, the system is close to neutral for taxable
investors (which can be seen by comparing the first three lines of Table 1). Taxexempts would have a preference for holding debt, but otherwise would be
indifferent. Choices by foreign investors would be distorted but the Treasury was
writing in 1992 when capital was less mobile and foreign investment less
important than it is now. As a result, the Treasury concluded that the efficiency
losses from these distortions were modest. Because, under their assumptions, a
dividend exclusion system could come relatively close, they reasoned that the

Comprehensive Business Income Tax, would have taxed all business income under a uniform,
business-level tax and would have come much closer to a uniform tax on all investments.
Treasury’s dividend exclusion system also did not exclude all dividends. Treasury was
concerned about the distribution of economic returns that had not been previously taxed at the
corporate level. It believed that these returns should be taxed at the shareholder level or they
would escape tax altogether. To ensure that the return on these investments was eventually taxed,
the Treasury proposed an accounting system which kept track of which distributions were out of
previously taxed income and which were not. These considerations are outside the scope of the
present inquiry.
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simplicity of the dividend exclusion system outweighed the efficiency costs of the
rate differentials that such a system imposes. 31
With a dividend, remittance of the tax is at the corporate level and there is no
additional reconciliation of tax to shareholder attributes. Most alternative
integration systems continue to have corporate-level remittance but add, on top,
some sort of shareholder-level reconciliation.
2.2 Dividend deduction.
The simplest system that taxes corporate income at shareholder rates is what
is known as a “dividend deduction” system. 32 Under a dividend deduction system,
corporations pay tax on their income, as under current law. When they distribute
earnings to shareholders, they deduct the distribution and shareholders include it
at their tax rate.
To illustrate using our running example, when the corporation earns $10, it
would owe tax on its $10 of gain. When it distributes the earnings, however, it
gets a $10 deduction, so the corporation would have no net income and pay no
tax. The shareholder has $10 of dividend income, which is taxed at the
shareholder rate. As a result, there is an initial corporate-level remittance of tax,
which, when a dividend is paid, is offset by a deduction at the corporate level, and
simultaneously, there is a corresponding inclusion at the shareholder level.
Note that this system does not quite tax corporate earnings at the shareholder
rate because retained earnings are taxed at the corporate rate during the period of

31

The Treasury also argued that tax-exempt investors should continue to face a corporate
level tax on their equity investments on the theory that business income should be taxed once. It is
not readily apparent, however, why taxing business income once is a desirable goal and how that
goal relatives to minimizing distortions from the corporate tax. I do not adopt the Treasury’s
“taxing business income once” approach here and instead focus on minimizing the economic
distortions caused by the current structure of the corporate tax.
32

The Treasury Department proposed a divided deduction system as part of its 1984 tax
reform study. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 2.
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retention. To see this, consider $1 of earnings that are retained for n periods.
These grow at 1  r 1 c . When this amount is distributed, it is deducted by
n

the corporation at rate c and included by the shareholder at rate d, resulting in a
value to the shareholder of 1  r 1 c 

n

 11dc .

If the amount were distributed

immediately, the value at time n to the shareholder would be

 11dc 1  r 1 t  .
n

Unless the corporate and shareholder rates are the same, the two will not be equal.
The two rates, however, cannot be equal for all shareholders because there is only
a single corporate rate and multiple shareholder rates (multiple shareholder rates,
after all, are the reason for using a dividend deduction system rather than a
dividend exclusion system). A particularly important case is investments by taxexempts, where (if marginal investments are not subject to UBIT), t = 0. In this
case, retained earnings grow at the after-corporate tax rate while distributed
earnings grow at the pre-tax rate.
Because they do not fully reconcile the tax on corporate income with
shareholder attributes, dividend deduction systems should be seen as trying to
strike a balance between the benefits of corporate remittance of tax and matching
the tax rate on corporate investments to other investments. There is a
reconciliation of tax rates at the shareholder level but the reconciliation is only
approximate. They do more than dividend exclusion systems do but do not fully
reconcile the corporate remittance with shareholder attributes.
2.3 Dividend deduction with withholding.
A problem with dividend deduction systems is that they ultimately rely on
shareholders to remit tax. The deduction on distribution offsets the corporate
remittance. Shareholders have to then separately send checks to the government
based on the dividends that they receive. This separate shareholder remittance
might generate high compliance and administrative costs.
“Dividend deduction with withholding” systems partially fix this problem by
requiring corporations to withhold the dividend tax and remit it to the government
on the shareholders’ behalf. Shareholders would then claim a credit on their
returns for the taxes paid on their behalf. The concept is similar to employer
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withholding on wages: employers remit wage taxes on behalf of their employees
who then claim a credit on their tax return for these payments.
To illustrate, in our example, in a dividend deduction system, a corporation
that earns $10 and distributes it, would claim a $10 deduction, so it would owe no
corporate tax. Under a dividend deduction plus withholding system, it would be
required to withhold taxes on the dividend. The corporation earns $10, deducts
$10, and owes no corporate tax, and it remits $4 of withholding taxes on the
shareholders’ behalf. The shareholder gets a $6 dividend but would be treated as
having $10 of dividend income, with $4 of it withheld and paid to the
government. If the shareholder is in the 40% bracket, he would owe $4 in tax. Just
like with wage withholding, he would receive a form telling him that taxes have
been withheld and he would show that amount on his return as taxes paid. He
would therefore owe no additional taxes. If instead, the shareholder were in the
50% bracket, he would owe $5 of taxes on the dividend. The corporation would
have remitted $4, so he would owe an additional $1. And if the shareholder were
tax-exempt, it would owe no taxes. The corporation would have paid $4, so in
theory, the shareholder would be entitled to a $4 refund.
This system mimics a dividend deduction system with the enforcement
advantages of withholding. An important difference between dividend deduction
and dividend deduction with withholding is that with the latter, the government
can adjust the allowable credit for the withheld taxes depending on the type of
taxpayer. In the example above, the government could choose whether to allow a
refundable credit to the tax-exempt shareholder. If, for whatever reason, it wants
tax-exempts’ investments in corporate stock to bear tax, it can limit the ability of
tax exempts to claim a credit for the withheld tax, either denying the credit
entirely or in part.
Note that like with a dividend deduction system, a dividend deduction with
withholding system only partially reconciles the tax on corporate investments
with the tax on outside investments. The tax on retained earnings is once again

 11dc 1  r 1 c .
n

Even if d = c, the return on retained earnings will not be the

same as on outside investments for all investors simultaneously because the
corporate rate cannot be set equal to the outside rate for different types of
investors.
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2.4 Credit imputation.
The dividend deduction with withholding system is not, to my knowledge,
currently used anywhere in the world. It is, however, identical in substance,
although with different labels, to a system that was once widely used in OECD
countries, known as the credit imputation system. In a credit imputation system,
the corporation pays tax on its income and cannot (nominally) deduct dividends.
Shareholders are taxed on dividends, but they can claim a credit against their
taxes for their share of the corporate tax. The net effect is to convert the corporate
tax into a withholding system.
To illustrate, in our example, the corporation would earn $10 and pay a tax of
$4. It would have only $6 to distribute. The shareholder would be treated as
receiving a dividend of $10 ($6 of cash and $4 of tax paid on the shareholder’s
behalf) and would owe tax on this amount. He would, however, get a credit for
the $4 of taxes paid by the corporation. If the shareholder’s tax rate is 40%, he
would owe $4 of tax on the $10 dividend but because of the credit for the
corporate tax, would owe no additional taxes. As with the dividend deduction
with withholding system, tax-exempt and foreign shareholders could be allowed,
or not, to claim credits for their share of the corporate tax.
The difference between the dividend deduction with withholding system and
the imputation credit system is just labelling. In the dividend deduction with
withholding system, there are three line entries at the corporate level: the
corporate tax, the offsetting deduction, and the withholding. If all are at the same
40% rate, on $10 of corporate income, there is a $4 tax, a $4 deduction, and $4 of
withholding, netting to a $4 payment to the government. With the imputation
credit system, there is just one line entry at the corporate level: the $4 of corporate
tax. The shareholder treatment is identical: the shareholder in both cases gets $6
in cash and is treated as receiving a $10 dividend and having $4 of tax paid on his
behalf.
The ALI proposed a credit imputation system in 1993. 33 European countries
used them widely until earlier this century. 34 They largely repealed these system
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AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 3 at 50–52.
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because of decisions by the European Court of Justice unrelated to the merits.
Some non-European OECD countries such as Australia still use credit imputation
systems. 35
In 2015, a working group of the Senate Finance Committee recommended a
dividend deduction with withholding system instead of a credit imputation
system. Their theory was that using different labels would result in different
behavior. Under the dividend deduction with withholding system there is,
nominally, no (or far less depending on the size of dividends versus corporate
income) corporate tax. The corporate tax of $4 in our example is reduced by the
dividend deduction worth $4 so the corporation pays no “corporate income tax.”
Instead of a corporate income tax, the corporation remits a “withholding tax” on
its shareholders’ behalf. The theory that this matters was, apparently, that the
accountants will treat the two systems differently and allow corporations to report
no, or lower, corporate taxes for accounting purposes under the
deduction/withholding system than the credit imputation system. Moreover, they
believed that the markets will believe the accountants that the systems are
different, namely that the dividend deduction with withholding system lowers
corporate taxes while a credit imputation system does not. They apparently had a
poor view of accountants and of markets.
The four systems described above (dividend exclusion, dividend deduction,
dividend deduction with withholding, and credit imputation) all have an initial
remittance of tax by corporations based on a computation of taxable income at the
corporate level. The alternative is to tax shareholders on their share of corporate
income directly rather than taxing corporations themselves.
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Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Jr. Warren, Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and
Economic of Europe, 115 YALE LAW J. 1186–1255 (2005).
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Canada, Chile, Mexico, and New Zealand also use full credit imputation systems, while
Korea uses a partial credit imputation system. Kyle Pomerleau, Eliminating Double Taxation
through Corporate Integration, TAX FOUNDATION, http://taxfoundation.org/article/eliminatingdouble-taxation-through-corporate-integration#_ftnref12 (last visited Aug 23, 2016).
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If corporations are not themselves taxed, the system has to have a way of
requiring shareholders to include corporate income on a current basis. If not,
corporations would effectively act like retirement accounts because they would
allow tax-free build-up until income is eventually distributed. The two primary
ways of requiring shareholders to include corporate income are the shareholder
allocation system and the shareholder mark-to-market system.
2.5 Pass-through or shareholder allocation.
Corporations could be taxed under a partnership model or what is sometimes
called shareholder allocation. Under a shareholder allocation system, corporations
would allocate their income to their shareholders, who would then be liable for
the resulting tax exactly like partners are liable for taxes on partnership income.
By taxing the income at the shareholder level, a shareholder allocation system
ensures that the income is taxed in much the same way it would be if it were
earned outside of a corporation. Notwithstanding the accuracy it would provide,
shareholder allocation systems are widely viewed as unadministrable in the
publicly-held corporation context, and have never been seriously proposed. 36
2.6 Shareholder mark-to-market.
Rather than allocating corporate income to shareholders, shareholders could
be required to pay tax currently on corporate earnings as measured by the change
in the value of their stock. 37 The change in value of their stock is, at least for
publicly traded corporations, easier to measure than corporate income and is
arguably a better measure of shareholder income.

36

37

See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 2 at 27.

A number of scholars have proposed shareholder mark-to-market systems. See Joseph M.
Dodge, Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-through Corporate-Shareholder Integration
Proposal, A, 50 TAX REV 265 (1994); David A. Weisbach, A Partial Mark-to-Market Tax System,
53 TAX REV 95 (1999); ERIC J. TODER & ALAN D. VIARD, MAJOR SURGERY NEEDED: A CALL FOR
STRUCTURAL
REFORM
OF
THE
U.S.
CORPORATE
INCOME
TAX
(2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2426657 (last visited Mar 18, 2016).
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To illustrate how this system works, the shareholder in our running example
invests $100 in the corporation which earns $110 in one year. Under a shareholder
mark-to-market system, there is no corporate tax, so the corporation has $110 in
after-tax earnings. The value of the stock would go up to $110. The shareholder
would have $10 of gain even if the stock is not sold or the $10 of earnings
distributed. The shareholder would owe $4 of tax, leaving him with a net return of
$106, which is the same as the return available outside of the corporate sector or
through corporate debt. Dividends would be taxable in this system, although
because they reduce the value of stock, they would also generate a mark-tomarket loss.
The key weakness of shareholder mark-to-market is that it is purely a
shareholder system. There is no corporate remittance of tax. Collecting tax at the
shareholder level may be much more difficult than collecting tax at the corporate
level. Moreover, a shareholder mark-to-market system makes it difficult to adjust
the treatment of tax-exempt or foreign shareholders for their investments in U.S.
corporations. Without a special rule (and for foreign investors, some sort of
collection mechanism), tax-exempt and foreign shareholders would not be taxed
under a mark-to-market system, which means that their investments in U.S. equity
would be tax free. This might be the right policy, but if it is not, a shareholder
mark-to-market system makes it difficult to impose a different policy.
3. New equity integration
With this background, we can turn to an examination of new equity
integration. In this part I will examine the efficiency properties of NEI and discuss
how we should analyze the problem of churning. In the next part, I consider the
design of NEI systems.
3.1. The Efficiency Effects of NEI
Consider the distortions from the corporate tax identified in Part 1. For
convenience, Table 1 is reproduced here. By setting the values for the various
taxes, t, c, td, and d, the table can represent the returns for an arbitrary type of
investor (for example, letting d = 0 for tax-exempt investors and d = w for foreign
investors).
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Table 1 (reproduced): Investment returns
Investment choice

After-tax return

1.

Non-corporate

1  r 1 t 

2.

New equity

1  r 1 c 1 d   d

3.

Debt

1  r 1 td 

4.

Retained earnings, corporate investment

1  r 1 c 1 d 

5.

Retained earnings, immediate distribution

1 d 1  r 1 t 

n

n

n

n

n

Suppose now that we have a method of exempting dividends attributable to
investments made with new equity and only new equity. What this means is that
the dividend tax in line 2 is set to 0 but the dividend tax in lines 4 and 5 is
unchanged from current law. As was discussed above, in a world with different
types of investors, setting c equal to t may be complex, but let us assume for now
that we have adopted one of the methods discussed above to achieve or mostly
achieve that.
With this system, lines 1, 2 and 3 now produce the same economic return, so
there is no tax incentive to change investment choices among non-corporate
investments, new equity, and debt. Moreover, lines 4 and 5 are the same (or close
to, depending on how close c is to t), so there is no incentive to distribute or retain
earnings. The results are presented in Table 4, assuming that t = c = td.
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Table 4: New Equity Integration
Investment choice

After-tax return

1.

Non-corporate

1  r 1 t 

2.

New equity

1  r 1 t 

3.

Debt

1  r 1 t 

4.

Retained earnings, corporate investment

1  r 1 t  1 d 

5.

Retained earnings, immediate distribution

1 d 1  r 1 t 

n

n

n

n

n

Note, most centrally, that the elimination of the disincentive to issue new
equity (making line 2 equal line 1) means that even if the Traditional View holds,
the corporate tax does not distort investments. The Traditional View is based on
the premise that corporate investments are financed through new equity, so
eliminating the disincentive to issue new equity directly addresses that concern. In
addition, if corporate projects might be financed with new equity in the future,
there would be, without integration, an incentive to retain earnings to avoid the
additional tax cost from new equity. But if the extra tax cost on new equity is
eliminated, so is the incentive to retain earnings.
Therefore, even under the Traditional View, integration for new equity and
only new equity eliminates the distortions from the corporate tax. That is,
regardless of whether the marginal source of funds is new equity or retained
earnings, if dividends attributable to new equity are exempt from tax, corporate
investment is not distorted. If the marginal source of funds is new equity, setting
lines 1, 2 and 3 equal eliminates the distortion. If the marginal source of funds is
retained earnings, setting lines 4 and 5 equal eliminates the distortion even if d is
left as is.
NEI achieves these efficiency benefits at a lower cost than complete
integration. Although a precise estimate of the cost difference is beyond the scope
of the analysis here, we can get a sense of the order of magnitude through some
simple calculations.
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Gross new equity issuances in the United States are about $150 billion per
year. 38 That stock will pay dividends which are currently taxed but which would
be exempt under NEI. Because the value of a share of stock is the present value of
the dividends (and other) payments on the stock, we know that the present value
of dividends on new equity is also $150 billion per year. Suppose, as assumed
above, that ⅓ of these shares – $50 billion – are held by taxable individuals. The
current tax rate on dividends is 20%, so the annual tax cost of eliminating that tax
under NEI would be about $10 billion.
The present value cost of NEI is the present value of $10 billion per year. For
simplicity, assume an infinite horizon, so that the present value is just the annual
flow divided by the discount rate. At an 8% discount rate, 39 the present value cost
of NEI is $125 billion.
Compare this to the complete integration proposal made by the Treasury
Department in 1992. That proposal exempted dividends on all stock, whether new
or old. Using the same reasoning, the present value of dividends on existing stock
is its value. The current capitalization of the US stock market is $27 trillion. 40 At
a 20% tax rate on ⅓ of investors, the present value tax to be received on existing
equity is $1.8 trillion. The total cost of complete integration is the cost of
integration for existing equity ($1.8 trillion) plus the cost of integration for new
equity ($125 billion), for a total of $1.9 trillion. This is more than 15 times greater
than the cost of NEI.

38

https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/corpsecure/current.htm (visited May
11, 2017). In both 2014 and 2015, equity issuances were $175 billion and in 2016, they were down
to $138 billion.
39

The discount rate should reflect the expected return on equities, which is not known. Even
determining a historic return is not straightforward because the value can vary widely depending
on the starting and stopping dates. For a discussion, see John Y. Campbell & Samuel B.
Thompson, Predicting Excess Stock Returns Out of Sample: Can Anything Beat the Historical
Average?, 21 REV. FINANC. STUD. 1509–1531 (2008).
40

2017).

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD?locations=US (visited August 2,
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There are numerous ways that this calculation is crude and possibly wrong,
although many refinements would affect both NEI and complete integration and,
therefore, may not affect the ratio of costs very much. I did not account for basis
in the calculation: I treated the $150 billion of present value dividends on new
stock as fully taxable but in fact, only the return above the initial purchase price
would be taxed. But I also did not account for basis in the existing $27 trillion of
stock. Adjusting for basis may change the ratio somewhat but would not likely
change the qualitative result because it was omitted from both the numerator and
denominator. In addition, the Treasury proposal did not exempt all dividends.
Instead, it had a complex procedure for exempting some but not all dividends
based on whether the dividends were paid out of income previously taxed in the
United States. But this system would apply to NEI as well which means that these
choices also affect both the numerator and the denominator.
I also did not account for share repurchases when estimating the cost of NEI.
Instead, I used gross equity issuances. If share repurchases reduce the benefits of
integration (as in some of the systems discussed below), the estimate should have
been based on net new equity. In recent years, this has often been low or zero,
which would correspondingly reduce the cost of NEI but not complete
integration. 41
Regardless of refinements, the core point will remain because it is driven by a
simple fact: there is a vastly larger base of existing equity than new equity, which
means that the cost of complete integration will be correspondingly greater than
the cost of NEI. A choice to have complete integration is a choice to give a
massive windfall to existing shareholders, reducing tax receipts with no efficiency
benefits.
The argument for NEI is an example of a more general problem, which is
determining when tax changes (or other legal changes) should be retroactive,
either fully or in the limited sense of applying to future income from existing
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https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/equity-issuance-and-retirementby-nonfinancial-corporations-20170616.htm (visited August 2, 2017).
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investments. 42 On the one hand, if we want to remove a distortion or to create an
investment incentive, it makes sense to do so only for new investments because
existing investments are sunk. If someone has already built a building, lowering
his tax rate to induce him to build it is not a good idea. It reduces tax revenue
without having the desired behavioral effect. The horse is already out of the barn,
if you will.
On the other hand, some argue that tax and legal changes should be
retroactive or apply to existing investments because people will anticipate
forthcoming changes. If the individual anticipates a lower tax rate on future
income from his building, he will be more likely to build it now. Retroactivity
effectively extends the benefits of current changes in the law to the past because
of this anticipation. If the changes are desirable, retroactivity, at least in the
limited sense of applying tax changes to future income from existing investments,
may also be desirable.
It is possible that if NEI becomes a prominent alternative that there could be
anticipation effects. Imagine, a year before legislation is passed, that the corporate
sector widely anticipates that new equity will be taxed at a lower rate than
existing equity. Applying NEI only to equity issued after enactment may freeze
up markets in the period before enactment. Why form a new corporation today
when your tax bill will be far lower if you wait and form it next year?
If this happens, it might be desirable to have an effective date for NEI that
includes the time period where there are anticipation effects. It seems unlikely,
however, that much, if any, of the $27 trillion of current stock investments was
made in anticipation of integration. Giving integration benefits to old equity
would be a lump sum subsidy, akin to giving a tax benefit to build a building that
was already built. And in the case of integration, the sums involved are large. It is
hard to see how the arguments in favor of tax retroactivity alter the argument for
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There is a substantial literature on transitions to new tax systems. See Michael Graetz,
Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 UNIV. PA. LAW REV. 47
(1977); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. LAW REV. 509–617
(1986).
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NEI over complete integration except perhaps for a short period of time
immediately before legislation is passed.
3.2 Equilibrium and International investors
As discussed in Part 1.2, the analysis of the distortions from the corporate tax
may change once we take into account price adjustments. In particular, Part 1.2
considered the possibility that the required corporate return is based on the
weighted average tax rate faced by investors. Because U.S. investors only hold a
modest portion of global wealth, integration that reduces dividend taxes on U.S.
investors would have only minor effects on the corporate cost of capital.
If this hypothesis is true, we may not want to integrate the corporate tax with
the shareholder tax. Conditional on choosing to have integration, however, the
case for NEI instead of complete integration is stronger. The reason why, is that
the efficiency gains from integration would be modest. It would, therefore, be
even more important that integration be targeted at the inefficiencies from the
corporate tax and that the cost be kept low. Relative to complete integration, NEI
does both: it directly targets the source of inefficiency and it costs much less than
complete integration.
Said another way, nothing in the analysis of equilibrium effect indicates that
it makes sense to lower taxes on existing equity. Doing so results in a windfall to
investors without creating direct efficiency gains. The equilibrium analysis
suggests that perhaps no integration plan is desirable, but conditional on believing
the benefits of integration outweigh the costs, NEI better targets the benefits and
minimizes the costs. If one is unsure about whether the benefits of integration
outweigh its costs, it is especially important to keep the costs down.
3.3 Churning should be treated like other avoidance.
If NEI achieves all of the efficiency gains of complete integration at a
fraction of the cost, the question is why most proposals are for complete
integration systems. In fact, to my knowledge, the only NEI systems ever adopted
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were the so-called Annell systems used by Sweden and Finland. 43 These systems,
both adopted in the 1960’s, allowed a deduction for dividends paid on new equity,
which is close to what the American Law Institute proposed in 1982 and 1989.
They were, however, abandoned in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. Although
understanding the reasons they abandoned the Annell systems would be helpful in
evaluating NEI, I have been unable to find literature explaining the historical
circumstances.
Outside of those examples, there is no experience with NEI, and few
commentators have addressed the issue. 44 It seems that the reason that NEI has

43

Andersson et al., supra note 8; King and Fullerton, supra note 8.
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An exception is the 1993 American Law Institute integration report, supra note 2, which
considers and rejects NEI (part 8, pages 205-209). The ALI report did not, however, reject NEI
because it would be too difficult to implement. The ALI offered four reasons. (There are actually
five items in the ALI’s list, but the fifth is that NEI could be adopted if desired.) First, the ALI
notes that complete integration will not only produce windfall gains. It will also produce some
windfall losses, depending on the choices that are made. This is true as far as it goes, but its
implications for the choice between NEI and complete integration are unclear. Moreover, given
the size of the windfall gains, there would have to be substantial losses to come close to offsetting
the gains, and the ALI does not identify any losses of this magnitude. Second, the ALI argues that
we could capture the windfall gains with an explicit tax on the gains. This is true and I consider
the design of an explicit tax below. This argument is, however, an argument for NEI, not against
it. Third, the ALI argues that windfalls could be eliminated if integration is part of an overall set of
tax changes that keeps the burden of capital the same. This may also be correct, and when
considering whether to adopt NEI or complete integration, we would have to consider the overall
package of reforms. But this argument does not make clear why we would want to give windfall
gains to shareholders and offset them by, presumably, non-lump sum taxes on capital more
generally. Finally, the ALI argues that windfalls are a necessary part of any basic structural change
to the tax law and are necessary to passage. This might be true, although it is not easy to know
what sorts of tax reforms can pass at any given time.
The Treasury Department integration study contains a paragraph (p. 109) that argues that we
should not adopt the American Law Institute 1989 NEI system because it believes that the
traditional view better describes the economics of the corporate tax. (It contains a somewhat
longer discussion that focuses on other aspects of the 1989 ALI report.) This claim does not make
sense. As explained in the text, NEI is better than complete integration regardless of which view,
the new or traditional, is correct.
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been largely ignored is that it is thought to have administrative problems that are
too difficult to solve. It is better to adopt complete integration notwithstanding its
higher revenue costs because of the administrative problems with NEI. 45
The key administrative problem presented by NEI (but not complete
integration) is distinguishing between new and old equity. This distinction may
not be easy to make. New stock is fungible with old stock in the same class, so
there will often be no way to distinguish the two by observable characteristics of
the shares. Moreover, even if new shares could be distinguished from old shares –
say a law required new shares to be identifiable – taxpayers will try to engage in
churning – transactions that try to get new equity treatment for old equity. For
example, if the distinction between new equity and old is a formal characteristic
of the stock, such special identifying numbers, corporations can redeem old shares
and issue new shares with the correct formal characteristics. All shares would
then have the characteristics of new shares with no change in the actual
economics. It is better, so the argument goes, to treat all equity the same than to
incur the administrative costs of attempting an infeasible task.
To understand whether this argument is a good one, we need to look at the
available methods of distinguishing old equity from new and evaluate their costs
and the extent that they allow churning. Before turning to these methods, it is
important to frame the inquiry properly.
Churning is a way of treating old equity as new equity for tax purposes. It is a
way of getting a beneficial tax treatment given to a specified activity (issuing new
equity) without actually engaging in that activity. It is like any other tax
avoidance or tax sheltering activity. It seeks to shift tax treatment of a behavior to
the favorable side of a line without truly changing the underlying behavior.
The costs and benefits of attempting to stop it should be analyzed the same
way that we analyze attempts to stop other tax avoidance. The usual approach to
tax avoidance it to attempt to devise rules that attempt to prevent it. We then
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This argument can be found in Auerbach, supra note 5 at 1262.
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compare the cost of administering those rules with the revenue raised and the
resulting economic distortions. 46
The logic for complete integration rather than NEI is that it is so costly to
enforce the line between old equity and new that we should not bother to try. It is,
effectively, a choice to allow free churning.
Only in rare cases, however, do we allow the equivalent of free churning –
explicitly allowing sheltering rather than trying to stop it. The check-the-box rules
are an example. Before check-the-box, the law attempted to make a distinction
between corporations and partnerships. Taxpayers, however, were easily able to
create entities which fell on whichever side of the line gave a better tax treatment.
Notwithstanding a fairly long period of attempts, there seemed to be no way to
police the line. While taxpayers were getting the treatment that they wanted, they
had to pay lawyers and bankers to structure deals and the government had to pay
staff to try to enforce the line. With the check-the-box rules, the government
threw in the towel and simply made the treatment elective except in places such as
public trading, where the line could easily be enforced. By making the treatment
elective rather than trying to enforce a distinction that was impossible to enforce,
we eliminated the structuring costs, without, at least in theory, changing the law
as it was actually applied on the ground. 47
Perhaps churning to avoid the limits of new equity integration is like
structuring entities to be either partnerships or corporations. It is simply so

46
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See Weisbach, supra note 6.

It is important to distinguish arguments for eliminating a line in the tax law that does not
make sense from arguments about enforcing a difficult line that does make sense. For example, the
tax law cannot easily distinguish debt from equity, and there have been proposals over the years to
treat the two the same. See, e.g., the proposal for a comprehensive business income tax put
forward by the DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 2. This is a different argument than
the argument for complete integration, which is that a line that does make sense is too hard to
enforce. Arguably, the check-the-box rules are an example of the former, eliminating a line that
does not make sense, although they could be an example of the latter if there are good reasons for
having different tax systems for different types of entities.
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difficult to stop churning that we should give up and allow it freely. Note,
however, that the check-the-box approach is a rare exception. In almost all cases,
we instead try to enforce rules rather than to make avoidance easier.
The question, then, is what are the administrative costs of preventing
churning? Is it worth bearing those costs to avoid the windfall gains that
automatic churning would grant? To answer this question, we must examine NEI
systems.
4. NEI Systems
To understand whether it is feasible to offer integration for new equity but
not old equity, I will consider three NEI systems: (1) an explicit transition tax
system; (2) a tracing system based on the 1982 and 1989 ALI reports; and (3) a
cash-flow system for equity that relies on consumption tax economics.
4.1 Explicit transition tax
In a 1990 paper, Alan Auerbach noted if we combine a complete integration
system with a one-time tax on existing equity, we get new equity integration.48
The way that Auerbach describes it, complete integration creates windfall gains to
existing equity because of the reduction in the dividend tax. The dividend tax was
already capitalized into its price, so any reduction in the dividend tax increases its
value without creating any beneficial incentives. We can eliminate that windfall
by imposing an explicit tax equal to the windfall.
To illustrate using a dividend deduction system, suppose that a corporation
with $900 of existing equity issues $100 of new equity. Complete integration
through a dividend deduction system would allow a deduction for all dividends,
both on the $900 of old equity and the $100 of new. If we combine this with a
one-time tax on the present value of the tax dividends that would have been paid
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Alan J. Auerbach, Debt, Equity, and the Taxation of Corporate Cash Flows, in DEBT,
TAXES, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 91, 115 (John Shoven & Joel Waldfoget eds., 1990).
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on the $900 of old equity, the net would, in present value, be a deduction only for
the $100 of new equity.
A key feature of this system is that it does not need to distinguish new equity
from old equity. It uses a complete integration system. Moreover, it is not based
on transactions, such as issuing new equity or redeeming old. As a result,
churning would likely be limited under this system. And because it is an explicit
tax, it would likely work with most complete integration systems. The explicit tax
would be imposed separately from the integration system, effectively just running
alongside the integrated corporate tax. As a result, we could choose the
integration system that best matches other policy goals.
While simple in concept, there will be a number of complex implementation
issues. The transition tax should be equal to the present value of the tax reduction
on dividends on existing equity. Estimating this value is not straightforward, and
colleting the tax may be difficult given its potential size.
An initial issue is determining the future dividends that will be paid on
existing equity. Auerbach suggests that we use the corporation’s earnings and
profits account because only distributions paid out of earnings and profits are
treated as dividends. The theory is that all earnings and profits will eventually be
paid out as dividends and the current value of the account is a good measures of
the present value of the future dividends.
In a commentary on Auerbach’s paper, Bill Andrews argues that many
corporations do not regularly update their earnings and profits accounts. 49 With
the nimble dividend rule, 50 if a corporation has current earnings and profits, there
is no need to compute accumulated earnings and profits, which means that many
corporations may not need to compute their accumulated earnings and profits. The
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William D. Andrews, Comment on Debt, Equity, and the Taxation of Corporate Cash
Flows, in DEBT, TAXES, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING (John B. Shoven & Joel Waldfogel
eds., 1990).
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transition tax would, however, be based on accumulated earnings and profits.
Determining the value of accumulated earnings and profits requires going back to
the formation of the corporation which, for some corporations, could be a long
time in the past. Auditing of the reported value would be difficult.
Leaving aside this problem, it is not clear that earnings and profits is the
correct value. Consider a corporation that is formed with $100 the day before we
pass a new equity integration system that uses an explicit transition tax. The
transition tax should be equal to the present value of the dividends on the $100 of
pre-existing equity. The corporation, however, has $0 (or one day’s worth of)
earnings and profits. There would be no transition tax even though there is $100
of old equity.
The value of the transition tax should be the present value of the reduction in
tax on existing equity. In theory, if integration were a surprise, this would be
measured by the change in the stock price on the effective date. As discussed
above, a corporation with $100 of earnings and with a 40% dividend tax, would
be worth $60 because that is the present value after-tax flows that can be received
by owning the stock. If the dividend tax were reduced to 10%, its value would go
up to $90. The $30 increase in value is the windfall that should be taxed under the
explicit transition tax system.
This amount, however, may be hard to measure because integration would
not be a surprise and because of the usual problems with making empirical
estimates in a complex environment. A particular problem is that the transition tax
that is expected to be imposed would affect the value of stock after enactment but
what we want to know the value of the stock would be without the transition tax.
In the example above, if the transition tax when the dividend tax rate is reduced to
10% was $30, the value the stock would not change. But determining the $30 tax
required observing a change in the stock value.
An alternative to trying to observe the price change is to use a proxy formula.
Suppose that the pre-enactment value of the company (based on the stock price) is
V1. This value is the present value of after-tax distributions. If the present value of
pre-tax distributions is x, the present value of after-tax distributions can be
expressed as V1  x 1 d1  , where d1 is the current dividend tax rate. We want to
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know what the windfall gains would be from complete integration, which means
that we want to know what the stock price would be if we enacted complete
integration.
As noted, the observable stock value after NEI is enacted, however, does not
reflect this windfall: the stock value is reduced by the transition tax, which is the
value we are trying to calculate. Instead of directly observing this value, we have
to infer it. If the dividend tax rate goes down to d2, using the same formula with
the new dividend tax rate, we get a value of V2  x 1 d 2 . We want to know V2
– V1. We cannot directly observe x or V2 but we can express the desired value
without reference to these values: V2 V1  V1

d1 d 2
1d1

. All of the required values

should be observable, at least for public companies: V1 is the stock value prior to
enactment, and d1 and d2 are the dividend tax rates.
This formula does not, however, account for shares held by tax-exempt
investors or foreigners, who may not receive benefits of integration. We would
have to adjust the formula for shares that do not receive tax benefit under the
chosen complete integration system.
The adjustment will depend on the integration system that is used. For
example, under a dividend exclusion system, taxable shareholders have their
dividend tax reduced but tax exempt shareholders would not. Foreign
shareholders would be somewhere in-between and it would depend on the extent
to which withholding taxes are retained. The correct transition tax under a
dividend exclusion system would require knowing the tax attributes of the
ultimate shareholders of the corporation.
Other systems of integration may offer reduce taxes for all shares, even those
held by tax-exempt and foreign shareholders. For example, Auerbach proposes
the transition tax in combination with a dividend deduction system. In a simple
dividend deduction system, a deduction is allowed for all dividends regardless of
the type of shareholder. In this case, we would not need to know the makeup of
the ultimate shareholders. In general, the information required to compute the
transition tax, therefore, will depend on the policy choices in the accompanying
complete integration system.
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If we need to know the tax attributes of the ultimate shareholders of the
corporation, it will greatly complicate the computation of the transition tax. As
noted, tracing through dividends to their ultimate owners (and determining their
tax liability) is not a straightforward exercise and estimates vary. Moreover, these
estimates, as difficult as they are, are done on an aggregate basis. Different
corporations may have different types of shareholders. An accurate transition tax
for a given corporation would have to estimate the present value of future tax
reductions on that corporation’s shareholders. This level of detailed measurement
is likely infeasible, which means that instead, we might have to use a sectoral or
even a simple national-level estimate. 51
Regardless of how the measurement is done, it would have to be based on a
date in the recent past rather than after enactment (or introduction of the
legislation). The reason is that if the date is known in advance, there would be an
incentive for taxable shareholders to sell their stock to tax-exempt shareholders
before the measurement date.
An additional issue with determining the amount of tax reduction under an
integration system is that some distributions may be in the form of share
repurchases and liquidations rather than dividends. Depending on the integration
system chosen, repurchases and liquidation payments may be treated differently
than dividends. For example, the Treasury 1992 dividend exclusion
recommendation would have allowed shareholders to exclude dividends but not
share repurchases, which would instead be treated as taxable sales. 52 The
American Law Institute 1993 imputation credit proposal, however, would allow
credits for share repurchases and liquidation payments. 53
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An alternative is that the burden of future dividend taxes is born equally by all
shareholders because the taxes are capitalized into the stock price. If this is true, measuring
shareholder types for each corporation would not be necessary, although an aggregate
measurement would be.
52

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 2. (recommendation 4)
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AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2. (proposal 7a)
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If the system of integration does not offer tax reductions to share repurchases
or to liquidation payments, these amounts would have to be subtracted from any
formula used to estimate the change in stock value to compute the transition tax.
These amounts, however, are effectively unknowable. We could perhaps try to
infer future repurchase policy from past repurchases, but there is no guarantee that
this would be remotely accurate. It is not clear how liquidation payments could be
estimated.
A final issue is that the integration system may not offer tax reductions for all
dividends. For example, the Treasury dividend exemption system would only
exempt distributions from income that was previously taxed at the corporate level.
Distributions of income that was not taxed, such as income protected by corporate
tax preferences, would not be exempt. To the extent that dividends are not
exempt, the transition tax has to be reduced. Once again, estimating this amount
would not be straightforward.
To summarize, an explicit transition tax is simple in conception but estimates
of the tax would be crude. Its value would depend on a number of policy choices
made in the accompanying complete integration system. Nevertheless, although
determining the tax would be complex and likely to be highly contested, once this
is done, the system would be a complete integration system, which would mean
that churning and other complexities of NEI would not be present. Moreover,
inaccuracies, if they are not too severe, may have few if any efficiency effects
because the transition tax is effectively lump sum. Therefore, a reasonable proxy
may be sufficient.
4.2 Tracing and the 1982/1989 ALI proposals:
Bill Andrews, as reporter for the 1982 and 1989 ALI subchapter C studies,
proposed a system of NEI that would allow a deduction for dividends on new and
only new equity. The key idea is to estimate the total amount of new equity for a
corporation and to allow a deduction for an imputed return on that amount,
effectively treating the imputed return on new equity like interest expense.
Because it involves tracing and imputing a return, this system is necessarily going
to be crude, and will involve simplifications and line drawing.
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Note that although Andrews proposed a pure dividend deduction system, the
tracing mechanism could be combined with other forms of integration. For
example, the system could be combined with a dividend withholding tax or
equivalently, with an imputation credit system. It could also be combined with a
dividend exclusion system by allowing only specified dividends to be excluded
from income.
Andrews made a number of choices in designing his system. Analyzing the
particular design choices he suggested, however, are less important than
understanding the key elements that any such system would have to have. 54
Therefore, for the most part, I consider here a generic tracing system rather than
his particular proposal.
The central element any such system is an account that tracks new equity.
The simplest component of the account is the value of new stock, which for the
most part would be the cash sales price of the stock. Stock issued for property or
for services would be more difficult to value.
The account would have to be reduced for reductions in equity. For example,
suppose that a corporation had $100 of old equity. If it issued $100 of new equity
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Andrews may not have been thinking about his system as an NEI system. We can see that
in his commentary on Auerbach’s proposed explicit transition tax. Andrews, supra note 50. On
page 133, he states that his proposal was an attempt, in part, to distinguish between an interest-like
return on amounts contributed to a corporation and the return on accumulated or retained earnings.
He concludes “although many of the effects of the reporter’s [Andrews’s] proposals would be
considerably like integration without windfalls, their origin and overall effects is much humbler:
simply to let equity contributions be treated henceforth for income tax purposes the way
borrowing has been treated all along.”
Because of this difference in focus, Andrews’s proposal would allow a deduction each year
for an imputed return on contributed capital but this amount does not accrue and accumulate if the
corporation does not pay dividends. Warren, in 1981, criticized the ALI for this aspect of the
proposal. Warren, supra note 2. Moreover, Andrews’s proposal does not reduce the account,
called the Contributed Capital Account or CCA, by ordinary dividends. Instead, he would require
the CCA to be reduced only by dividends above a specified return. An approach that designed to
be a NEI system, would probably make different choices on these and other dimensions.

New Equity Integration

Page 50

and then repurchased $100 of stock, it should be treated as having no net new
equity. All it has done is churn. Stock repurchases would be a clear example of a
reduction in equity, but the account would have to have rules for dealing with
dividends. Andrews would have reduced the account only for large dividends but
all dividends reduce outstanding equity, so it might be better to reduce the account
by dividends paid regardless of size.
Reductions in equity may also occur in mergers and acquisitions. For
example, if one corporation purchases the stock of another for cash, cash will
have left corporate solution, which means that there should be a reduction in the
account. Rules would also be needed for how the account is split among
subsidiaries because subsidiaries may have minority shareholders or may be spun
off. For example, if a corporation has $100 of assets, and contributes $30 to a new
subsidiary which it spins off, we would need to determine how much, if any, of
the account shifts to the new subsidiary.
Finally, we would need rules for how the account adjusts over time.
Presumably the account would increase in each period by the imputed return.
Once we have the account set up, the system needs to impute a return to the
account, which means determining the appropriate interest rate. Because stock
does not have a fixed return and because the stock of different companies will
have different expected returns, any value will be just a guess. The question in
choosing the value is whether a single value should be used for all corporations or
whether we make an attempt to determine values for different corporations or
different types of corporations. For example, asset pricing models could be used
to adjust for the riskiness of different companies so that the imputed return better
reflects their true cost of capital. If we do not do this, risky companies, which
should have higher expected returns, would effectively bear a tax penalty.
Finally, the system would need a stacking rule to determine what portion of a
dividend is paid on new equity and what portion is paid on old equity. To
illustrate, if a corporation has $900 of old equity and $100 of new (as measured
by the account), we need to decide what portion of each dividend is paid on the
new. Pro ration may make sense but it would require us to not only determine the
amount of new equity (which is tracked by the account) but also the amount of
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old equity. Another possibility, which is what Andrews recommended, is to stack
dividends first against new equity. Under this approach, dividends up to the
imputed return on the $100 of new equity would be eligible for integration
benefits (such as being deductible). Any dividend above this amount would be
treated as paid on old equity. This stacking rule seems arbitrary but it is also
simple.
As can be seen from this description, a tracing system would be complex and
would necessarily be crude. Almost any set of rules would leave some room for
manipulation.
Beyond the complexities and inaccuracies of the system, and the resulting
manipulation and avoidance, a key problem is that it would be effectively
perpetual. That is, all of the complexities and the incentives to manipulate would
be around for a very long time. An explicit transition tax, by contrast, is initially
complex but then disappears. One possibility for a tracing system is to phase it out
over time on the theory that over time, more and more equity will have been
issued post-enactment, which would mean that the need for the system would go
down.
4.3 Consumption tax approaches.
The basic idea behind a consumption-tax approach to NEI is that a cash-flow
consumption tax imposes a one-time tax on existing capital and exempts future
returns on all capital. This is exactly what we want for stock returns in an NEI
system: we want to combine complete integration with a one-time transition tax.
Rather than doing that explicitly, as discussed above, we can do it implicitly by
taxing stock on a consumption basis. To explore this in more detail, I first lay out
the familiar effects of a cash-flow consumption tax. Then I discuss two different
ways of implementing a cash-flow tax for stock, one at the corporate level and
one at the shareholder level.
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4.3.1 Cash-flow tax basics.
A cash flow consumption tax allows an immediate (refundable) deduction for
the cost of investments and imposes a tax on the proceeds from the sale of
investments. 55 To see how this works, consider an investor who has $100 of
capital that he wishes to invest and he can get a return of $110 in one year.
Assume that the tax rate is 40%.
Suppose that a cash flow tax is already in place. The individual newly
investing $100 (say, from his salary) would claim an immediate deduction of the
$100. With a 40% tax rate, the deduction is worth $40. When the investment is
sold for $110, the individual owes taxes on the $110 of proceeds, so the tax is
40% of $110, or $44. 56
The tax of $44 is precisely the future value of the $40 tax savings from the
deduction (computed using the rate of return on the available investment). The net
present value of the tax savings and the tax is zero. Therefore, the investment is
effectively tax-exempt. It is as if the government gave the investor, in the form of
a deduction, an additional $40 to invest on its behalf, and the government claims
the return on that investment, in the form of taxes.
Now consider what happens to investments that are already in place at the
time the cash-flow tax is imposed. Suppose that the day before the cash-flow tax
is imposed, the individual invests the $100. Because there was no cash-flow tax at
the time of the investment, the individual could not deduct the $100. The next
day, the cash-flow tax is imposed. Next year, when the individual sells the
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See, e.g., NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX 176–178 (1955); William D.
Andrews, Consumption-Type Or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, A, 87 HARV. LAW REV. 1113–
1188 (1973); DAVID F. BRADFORD, Transition to and Tax-Rate Flexibility in a Cash-Flow-Type
Tax, in TAXATION, WEALTH, AND SAVING (2000).
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This is simplified somewhat. The investor would have to invest the tax savings and when
he does so, this generates another deduction and more savings. Eventually, the total investment is
$x/(1-t) where $x is the initial, pre-tax investment and t is the tax rate. The same logic used in the
simplified presentation in the text applies to the more complete case.
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investment for $110, he owes $44 in taxes because of the cash flow tax. The net
tax is $44.
The tax of $44 when the investment is sold is the same in present value terms
as a tax of $40 when the investment was made. Therefore, we can think of the
cash-flow tax as imposing a tax on the value of existing investments at the time of
enactment, collected (in future value terms) when the investments are sold.
As a final case, suppose that the investor makes the $100 investment after
enactment but now suppose that the investment has a higher than normal return,
say a return of $120 instead of $110. That is, assume that the investment earns a
20% return when the normal return for investments of this level of riskiness is
10%. With a $100 investment, the investor is able to earn $10 of economic
profits. The investor gets a $40 deduction when he makes the investment and
owes $48 when he sells it. We can decompose the tax on sale as a $44 tax on the
normal $110 return and a $4 tax on the $10 of additional profit. The $44 tax is, in
the present value terms, the same as the $40 deduction, so these offset. The
investor still owes the additional $4: the $10 of profit is fully taxed. That is, a
cash-flow tax not only taxes transition capital. It also taxes any returns above the
normal rate of return, which I will call economic profits or, simply, profits. 57
The goal is to use these economics to create an NEI system. There are a
number of possibilities. I will explore two.
4.3.2 Corporate cash-flow tax on stock
Suppose that we allow corporations a deduction on the value of any stock that
they issue after the date of enactment. Note that this means that they would get a
deduction on the receipt of cash or property when they issue stock. At the same
time, shift the dividend tax currently paid by shareholders to the corporate level:
the corporation pays a tax on any distribution with respect to its stock (whether a
dividend, repurchase, or liquidation payment) but shareholders are not taxed on
the receipt of the distribution. This creates a cash-flow tax for stock at the
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These amounts are also sometimes called inframarginal returns.
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corporate level, though with the tax reversed from the normal case: receipts
generate a deduction while outlays generate a tax. The reversal is because the
issuer of the securities (the corporation) is taxed instead of the purchaser. The
issuer is simply standing in place of the investor, who would have the opposite
flows and would, under a cash-flow system, be able to deduct cash outlays and
been taxed on cash inflows.
For all stock issued after enactment, the economics of a cash-flow system
ensure that the present value tax on stock investments is zero (other than the
corporate tax itself). The tax paid on distributions equals the benefit of the
deduction when the stock is issued. New equity does not bear a dividend tax
under this system. Old equity, however, would not have received a deduction
when issued. The distributions tax substitutes for the current dividend tax, so
effectively that tax stays in place. The system removes the dividend tax on new
equity but not old equity, as desired.
Those familiar with the Meade Commission report will recognize this system
as what they called an S tax.58 It is a cash-flow consumption tax on stock flows at
the corporate level. In this case, however, we are combining an S tax with a
corporate-level income tax because our goal is corporate integration. The Meade
Commission considered a pure S tax because they were examining a wholesale
shift to a consumption base.
We can also see this as a version of the Andrews/ALI tracing system. The
tracing system allows a deduction for future distributions on new stock. A cashflow system instead allows a deduction for the value of the stock up front. But
because the value of the stock should be equal to the present value of future
distributions, the two systems have (roughly) the same present value (leaving
aside the inevitable inaccuracies in the ALI system).
The cash-flow system, however, is much simpler than the ALI system
because we would not have to keep track of an account that measures new equity
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and we would not need to determine an imputed return. A cash-flow system does
both automatically and far more accurately than an explicit system would.
Note that the cash-flow system also has the potential to greatly simplify the
taxation of corporate distributions. In a discussed in a separate section of the ALI
report and as further explored in a paper by George Yin, 59 shifting the dividend
tax to the corporate level could greatly simplify the tax rules governing
distributions. It would eliminate the need for distinctions between distributions
and redemptions and for the host of related rules that try to keep taxpayers from
taking advantage of the basic rules. Instead, all distributions on corporate stock,
regardless of form, would have the same tax.
The system is not entirely without complexities and economic issues,
however. If it were seriously pursued, many would likely arise. Consider the
following five.
First, note that there is an important economic difference between most
integration proposals and this system. Most integration systems, whether NEI or
complete, exempt the entire return to stock investments (with perhaps policybased exceptions such as a decision to tax dividends that are paid out of income
that has not been taxed at the corporate level). A corporate cash-flow system for
stock exempts only the normal return. If stock earns an economic profit, the
present value of the tax on distributions will exceed the benefit of the deduction
when the stock is issued. Economic profits, therefore, would be taxed by the
normal corporate tax and again by the distributions tax under a cash-flow system.
Second, when we remove the shareholder-level tax on dividends, it is not
clear what to do about the shareholders’ basis in their stock. Yin suggests that
with a well-designed distributions tax we do not need to tax capital gains and
would therefore not need to keep track of shareholder basis. Stock sales would be
tax-free.
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AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 3; George K. Yin, Different Approach to the
Taxation of Corporate Distributions: Theory and Implementation of a Uniform Corporate-Level
Distributions Tax, A, 78 GEORGETOWN LAW J. 1837 (1989).
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This would be a very substantial change (on top of integrating using an Sbased tax, which would be a large change on its own). It is also not clear that it is
necessary or appropriate. To the extent of shareholder basis, existing equity would
not be taxed under current law. 60 Therefore, allowing a recovery of that basis is
consistent with not giving a windfall to old equity.
The considerations regarding shareholder basis under a corporate cash-flow
system for stock is similar to the considerations for regarding shareholder basis a
dividend exemption system, such as that proposed by the Treasury in 1992. In
both cases, shareholders are not tax in distributions but, if the basis and capital
gains tax is retained, are taxed on sales. The Treasury decided to keep the
basis/capital gains tax system under the dividend exemption system, and that
same choice could apply here. 61
Third, because the distributions tax is at the corporate level, it would be
imposed on distributions to tax-exempts and foreigners. This is not a problem for
new equity because the distributions tax on new equity has zero present value
(other than for profits). The way exemption is achieved would be different: under
current law tax-exempt investors are fully exempt from the tax on dividends while
under a corporate-level cash-flow system for stock, their exemption would arise
via the economics of a cash-flow tax. The exemption would, nevertheless be
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Dividends fully taxable and shareholders cannot use stock basis to reduce the taxable
portion of dividends. Dividends, however, they reduce the value of stock so that when the stock is
sold, shareholder basis is a greater percentage of value or may even produce a loss. For example, if
a shareholder has basis in stock equal to its value, the shareholder does not bear any dividend tax
notwithstanding that the basis cannot be used against dividends. Any tax on dividends is offset by
a loss on the sale of the stock.
61

Note that when a shareholder sells stock back to the corporation in a stock repurchase, the
shareholder would face a tax. This may seem inappropriate because the corporation would owe a
distributions tax. But this is exactly what happens under the Treasury dividend exemption system.
That system had neither a corporate level deduction for stock issuance nor a distributions tax. For
new equity, however, those two taxes have present value of zero, which is what the Treasury
system had. An alternative would be to exempt shareholders from capital gains taxes for
repurchases, although doing so would introduce complexities because sales to different purchasers
would generate different tax consequences.
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preserved (other than for economic profits). Similar reasoning applies to foreign
investors.
The more difficult issue is that the distributions tax would apply to
distributions on old equity held by tax-exempts and foreigners. In effect, the
transition tax under a corporate-level cash-flow tax on stock would be too broad
because it would apply not only to distributions that would have been taxable
under current law but also to distributions that would have been entirely or largely
free from tax. Because the tax is at the corporate level, there is no straightforward
way to adjust it to remove this tax.
On the one hand, this seems to make the tax vastly overbroad. Under my
assumption that only ⅓ of stock is ultimately held by taxable investors, the
transition tax would be triple what it should be.
On the other hand, there may be few distorting effects because of this overlybroad transition tax. The investments are already sunk, so to some extent, such a
tax would be lump sum. The set of arguments about whether such a tax would
indeed by lump set parallel the arguments about whether the tax on existing
capital on imposition of a consumption tax would be lump sum. There is a large
literature on the effects of this transition, with arguments going both ways. 62
To the extent that we do not want to impose this tax, corporations could be
offered relief in a manner similar to the way that Auerbach’s explicit transition
tax was calculated. That is, Auerbach’s explicit transition tax potentially required
an estimate and an adjustment to the tax for shares held by exempts and
foreigners. That same information could be used to provide a tax reduction under
a corporate-level cash-flow tax on stock.
Fourth, there would be some potential avoidance transactions, and rules
would be needed to combat them. The Meade Commission discusses a number of
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Louis Kaplow, Capital Levies and Transition to a Consumption Tax, in INSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC FINANCE, ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 112–146 (Alan J.
Auerbach & Daniel Shaviro eds., 2008).
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them. One is that corporations could sell stock to one another to generate
deductions without genuinely issuing new equity. The correct deduction is the net
amount of stock issued by the corporate sector to the unincorporated sectors of the
economy. As a result, the Meade Commission (p. 234) would not allow a
deduction in these circumstances.
Another avoidance transaction highlighted by the Meade Commission (p.
241) is to leverage the company prior to enactment by issuing debt and redeeming
stock. Then, after enactment, corporations could reverse the leverage by issuing
new stock and repurchasing the debt. The stock repurchase prior to enactment
would not be subject to the distributions tax but the stock issuance after would
generate a deduction, effectively churning the stock. Rules would be needed to
prevent this.
Fifth and finally, we would need to think about rules for subsidiary
corporations and whether it makes sense for them to be on a cash-flow system for
stock held by their parent corporation. Technically, such a system could work but
it would be novel, and it would impose an additional layer of tax on economic
profits and transition would be difficult.
To illustrate, suppose that a corporation purchases an asset for $1. If it
operated the asset itself, it would be taxed on any gains, including economic
profits, at its rate. Suppose instead that it contributed the asset to a subsidiary. If
the subsidiary were on a cash-flow system for its stock, the subsidiary would get a
$1 deduction. It would have a $1 basis in the asset and would be taxed on any
gains, including economic profits. When it distributes the proceeds to the parent,
it would pay a distributions tax. If there are no profits, this distributions tax
would, in present value terms, offset the deduction for the stock issuance, so the
overall level of tax would be the same as without the cash-flow system. But if
there were profits, the cash-flow system would impose a present value tax on the
profits, a tax that would be on top of the income tax already paid by the
subsidiary.
Moreover, there is no need to impose a transition tax on existing equity of
subsidiary corporations, which would be one of the effects of imposing a cashflow tax. The tax on existing equity is to prevent windfalls that would be
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generated by lowering dividend taxation. But dividends of subsidiary corporations
are not taxed under current law, so there is no need for a transition tax. Moreover,
the tax could be positively harmful because it would tax businesses that organized
using subsidiaries higher than similar businesses that organized using divisions.
As a result, it would make sense to keep the taxation of subsidiary
corporations the same as it is under current law rather than putting them on a
cash-flow system. Moreover, this logic likely applies to all stock held by
corporations. The design question would be to what extent can corporations
distinguish the taxation of distributions based on the type of shareholder, and,
moreover, how do we deal with the transfer of stock between corporate and other
shareholders Although there are likely solutions, no solution is likely to be
perfect.
4.3.3 Shareholder level cash-flow tax
An alternative is to impose the cash-flow system at the shareholder level.
Shareholders would get a deduction for stock purchases and would be taxed on
distributions. The basic economics would be the same as the tax at the corporate
level: under a cash flow system, the normal return is exempt, profits are taxed,
and old equity is taxed.
The key change would be who remits the tax. Unlike with corporate-level
remittance, with shareholder-level remittance, the tax attributes of the shareholder
determine the amount remitted. Taxable shareholders would be subject to the
cash-flow tax and would have the results just described (exemption of the normal
return, taxation of profits, and a tax on existing equity). Absent special rules, taxexempt shareholders would not be subject to the cash-flow system because of
their exemption. Similarly, foreign shareholders would likely be subject to the
cash-flow system because they do not normally pay U.S. tax on stock sales.
Therefore, tax-exempt and foreign shareholders would not have any change from
current law, and their taxation would be as described in Tables 2 and 3 above. As
a result, the tax on transition and on profits would fall only on taxable investors. If
taxable and tax-exempt shareholders own ⅔ of corporate tax, this would be a
substantial difference in results compared to a corporate-level cash-flow system.
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A second difference between the shareholder-level and corporate-level tax is
the treatment of sales between investors. As discussed, with a corporate-level
cash-flow system, we might be able to keep the capital gains tax and basis system
for sales of stock, or we might possibly be able to eliminate the capital gains tax
and basis system. With a shareholder-level cash-flow tax, we would have to tax
stock sales on a cash-flow basis and eliminate the basis system. If we did not,
there would be relatively simple arbitrages which take advantage of the
differences between a cash-flow system and a basis system.
To illustrate, consider a tax-exempt investor, and suppose that we retained the
basis system for taxable shareholders while also allowing them a deduction for
stock purchases. If the tax-exempt were to purchase stock directly from a
corporation, it would not get a deduction for the purchase and would not be taxed
on distributions. To get the equivalent of a deduction for the purchase without a
corresponding tax on distributions, a taxable shareholder could purchase the stock
from the corporation and sell it to the tax-exempt. If there were basis, the taxable
shareholder would get a deduction but would not be taxed on sale. The taxexempt entity would then receive the distributions free of tax. We could not
readily allow a deduction for stock purchases and at the same time use allow
shareholders to get a cost basis in their stock.
To implement a pure cash-flow system for stock, we could eliminate all basis
in stock, which is what is often contemplated (for all assets) on a switch to a
consumption tax. This result would likely raise objections. A better approach
might be to allow taxable shareholders to amortize their basis over time but to
detach the basis from stock sales, treating sales on a cash-flow system. This
approach would mean that shareholders would still get the benefit of their existing
stock basis but at the same time would allow stock sales to be taxed under a cashflow system.
Putting stock on a cash-flow system would mean that sales between different
types of shareholders would have very different effects than they do under current
law. To understand the effects of sales, we need to consider four possibilities
(treating tax-exempts and foreigners the same for the purpose): sales from taxable
shareholders to other taxable shareholders and to tax-exempt or foreign
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shareholder, and sales from tax-exempt or foreign shareholder to similar
shareholders and to taxable shareholders.
A sale from a taxable shareholder to another taxable shareholder would,
under a cash-flow system, generate a tax on the full value of the stock to the seller
and an offsetting deduction to the purchaser. There would be no net tax. In effect,
the deduction attributable to the investment in the stock would be transferred to
the purchaser. The seller, having gotten a deduction when he purchased the stock,
would reverse that deduction by being taxed on the sale.
A sale from a taxable shareholder to a tax-exempt or foreign shareholder
would generate a tax on the full value of the stock to the seller but no deduction
for the purchaser. This makes sense because the seller would have gotten a
deduction for his initial purchase, so we want tax his sale. We might think of the
net tax on the sale as an exit tax: when the stock is shifted from a taxpayer to a
non-taxpayer, we want to impose a tax so that gains do not escape the system.
Sales from foreign or tax-exempt shareholders to foreign or tax-exempt
shareholders would not generate any tax because the seller would not be taxed on
its receipt and the buyer could not claim a deduction. Finally, a sale from a taxexempt or foreign shareholder to a taxable shareholder would generate a net
deduction: the seller would not be taxed but the buyer would get a deduction. This
is essentially the reverse of the exit tax: in this case, the stock moves into the
taxable sector, so we need to allow a deduction because all sales proceeds or
distributions on the stock will be taxable.
The analysis of corporate shareholders under a shareholder-level cash-flow
system parallels the discussion of corporate shareholders under a corporate-level
cash-flow system. For similar reasons, it would not likely make sense to put
corporate shareholders under a cash-flow tax for their stock. In a shareholderlevel system, however, the design considerations might be simpler because the tax
treatment (no cash-flow tax) and the relevant attributes that determine that
treatment (being a corporate shareholder) are determined at the same place.
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4.4 Summary
The analysis of the three NEI systems was preliminary. It would take much
more study before such a system could be implemented. The preliminary analysis
shows that none of the systems are without problems. On the other hand, it also
shows that there are potentially feasible NEI systems and NEI should not be
dismissed out of hand in favor of complete integration.
5. Summary and conclusions
The efficiency benefits of corporate integration only require that integration
be given to new equity, not old. This is true regardless of whether one thinks that
the new view or the traditional view better describes the corporate tax. Leaving
aside administrative considerations, new equity integration is strictly better than
complete integration. It provides all of the efficiency benefits of complete
integration at a fraction of the cost.
The key problem with NEI that it must distinguish new equity from old. I
considered three possible systems for doing so: an explicit transition tax, a tracing
system, and a cash-flow system (at either the corporate level or at the shareholder
level). Each presents issues. The explicit transition tax would be relatively crude
but has the advantage of being temporary and not interfering with the normal tax
rules. The tracing system would be complex and difficult to implement and would
also likely be crude. It would not accurately measure the returns to new equity but
it would be workable. It has been used in the past. The two cash-flow systems
would be novel and to some extent, unintuitive. There would be a substantial
number of implementation issues. Of the three, the explicit transition tax would be
the simplest and cleanest method of preventing windfalls to existing equity and, in
my view, would be the best choice.
The policy question is whether the complexities of the NEI systems are worth
their quite substantial cost savings. Although we do not know the answer without
a much more detailed exploration of the issue, the answer, I believe, is potentially
yes. As a result, future research should focus on NEI systems rather than complete
integration systems.

